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Gympie Regional Council (GRC) have committed to improving their asset management practices and 
have recognised that an Asset Criticality Analysis is a key tool that can be used to prioritise and support 
decision making. An Asset Criticality Analysis determines a score based on an asset’s consequence of 
failure and the probability of that failure occurring which allows ranking. This dissertation describes 
the development and documentation of an Asset Criticality Analysis framework customised towards 
GRC’s Water Business Unit for application to a database of water and sewerage assets totalling $338M 
in value. 
 
Consequence of failure criteria were developed in alignment with GRC’s Enterprise Risk Management 
Framework. The consequence of failure criteria was then weighted with regards to comparative 
importance utilising the Analytical Hierarchy Process developed by Thomas Saaty (1980). A 
consequence severity scoring scale was selected, and severity definitions/guidelines established to 
support consistent assessment of impacts of failure. A computerised model in the form of a Microsoft 
Excel spreadsheet was created to allow data input, calculate criticality scoring and display results. 
 
The framework was applied to 2681 water assets and 2045 sewerage assets which were selected from 
each of the common asset categories. Within the total 4726 assets considered, 4209 assets were 
considered to have “Low Criticality”, 350 considered of “Moderately Low Criticality”, 141 considered 
of “Moderate Criticality”, 25 considered of “High Criticality” and 1 considered as of “Extreme 
Criticality”. For the higher criticality assets, the results indicated that the framework was successful in 
producing scores that allowed clear prioritisation. However, many lower criticality assets that were 
very similar had equal scores which meant they could not be individually prioritised. This indicated that 
amendments to the framework are required to improve the granularity of scoring. 
 
Noting that further development is required to improve the analysis, the results indicated that the 
framework was suitable for preliminary use by GRC to inform decision making and capital works 
budgets and prepare data collection, condition assessment and maintenance management programs. 
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A consistent theme in the operation of businesses and organisations with large numbers of assets is 
the need to implement effective asset management practices. Significant research into the 
management of assets has continuously developed over time with ISO 55000 Asset Management first 
published in 2014. The International Organisation for Standardization (ISO) (2014) suggest that some 
benefits of asset management include: 
 
• improved financial performance; 
• informed asset investment decisions; 
• managed risk; 
• improved services and outputs; 
• enhanced reputation; and 
• improved efficiency and effectiveness. 
 
The management of risks and making informed asset investment decisions are key aspects of asset 
management as they are interlinked and have a direct impact on the positive or negative outcomes of 
benefits. This suggests the need for organisations to prioritise asset related investments with respect 
to risks using prioritisation techniques and tools. 
 
The Institute of Public Works Engineering Australia (IPWEA) National Asset Management Strategy’s 
(NAMS) Council (2011) advocate that by identifying critical assets and their failure modes, 
organisations can effectively target investigative activities (such as condition assessment), improve the 
efficiency of maintenance operations/planning and optimise capital expenditure planning across their 
asset portfolio. 
 
Prioritisation of critical assets is particularly vital for organisations that own, operate and maintain 
large portfolios of infrastructure assets and provide essential services to customers. Municipal service 
providers such as local government Council’s and service authorities are key examples of such 
organisations. These organisations are required to provide continuous and acceptable levels of service 
to stakeholders and are governed by many legislative requirements. Poor asset management practices 
can lead to unexpected asset failure, high capital expenditure and inefficient operations exposing the 
organisation to significant risks (Justin 2018). 
 
An asset criticality analysis and prioritisation systematically identifies assets with high probability and 
consequence of failure and ranks them in order of criticality. This allows an organisation to make 
informed asset investment decisions in terms of maintenance activities, operations optimisation and 
capital renewals/expenditure (Park et al. 2010). 
 
Providing drinking water and sewerage treatment services to the community involves many significant 
risks, which if not controlled correctly can result in severe consequences. When asset failures occur 
there can be significant financial and reputational loss, political and media attention, environmental 
and social impacts, breaches of legislation compliance and service standards and risk to public health 
and safety. Many failure incidents have occurred in Australia as assets built in the 20th century begin 
to reach the end of their useful life. A recent sewerage spill occurred in October 2018 when a Sydney 
Water pump station wall collapsed, discharging raw sewage into Parramatta River and causing 
significant environmental damage (Calderwood 2018). In April 2019, one of Adelaide’s busiest roads 
was reduced to one lane due to a water main operated by SAWater bursting within the roadway. The 
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same water main experienced multiple failures along its length shortly prior to and following the event, 
significantly disrupting traffic and attracting negative media attention (Polychronis 2019). Both of 
these assets are highly critical due to the consequence of their failure on their surrounding 
environment. It is unknown what systems Sydney Water and SAWater have in place however an asset 
criticality analysis may have helped justify the allocation of resources to complete a detailed condition 




Figure 1-1: A burst water main causing traffic delays in Adelaide (Burton 2019) 
 
 
This dissertation describes the development of an Asset Criticality Analysis framework that can be used 
to prioritise assets. The aim of this work to provide Gympie Regional Council (GRC) with a criticality 
analysis tool and methodologies supported by documented research for its water and sewerage assets. 
The outcomes of this research are to be further developed by GRC and used to prioritise the collection 
of asset data, targeting of condition assessment, development of maintenance programs and 
ultimately inform the capital works program each year. Further detail regarding the research objectives 





 Idea Development 
 
GRC’s asset management practices are generally less developed than the rest of the industry, 
particularly the larger neighbouring Sunshine Coast Council/Unitywater and Fraser Coast Council/Wide 
Bay Water. Working with the challenge of limited budgets and resources, GRC’s Water Business Unit 
(WBU) committed to a program of asset management development in 2017 including updates to asset 
management plans to align with ISO 55000 Asset Management, implementation of water/sewerage 
modelling software and procurement of a maintenance management system.  
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A search of the USQ Library resources identified research into an “Asset Criticality Framework” at 
Toowoomba Regional Council (TRC). The study by Olsen (2015) developed an asset criticality 
framework based on policies specific to the TRC which was then applied to water and sewerage assets 
to determine effective maintenance management methodologies for assets classes and prioritise 
maintenance of critical assets. The research was specific to TRC and utilised an existing high-quality 
asset data register and modelling software outputs and a maintenance management system was 
already in place (Olsen 2015). 
 
The research by Olsen (2015) supported the hypothesis that the implementation of an asset 
prioritisation tool is essential for a water & sewerage authority to make informed decisions regarding 
the management of their assets and therefore vital for the WBU to implement as part of their asset 
management improvements.  
 
The aim of this work was to develop a similar framework that is specific to the GRC WBU and takes 




 Gympie Regional Council 
 
The Gympie region is located in south-east Queensland approximately 170km north of Brisbane with 
an estimated population of 51,586 residents (ID Consulting 2018). The region covers 6,898 sq kms 
stretching between Goomeri in the west, Rainbow Beach in the east and Imbil in the south (GRC 2019). 
Gympie is the economic centre with agriculture, forestry and fishing the major industries in the region. 
 
Gympie was proclaimed a municipality in 1880 and officially declared a city in 1905 (Queensland State 
Archives 2016a). The original City of Gympie and Shire of Widgee were amalgamated in 1993 to form 
the Shire of Cooloola, amalgamating again in 2008 when Kilkivan Shire, Cooloola Shire and part of Tiaro 








 Water Business Unit (WBU) 
 
GRC’s organisational structure is separated into four functional areas which provide a range of services 
to the Gympie region (GRC 2017b): 
 
• Office of the CEO 
• Infrastructure Services 
• Planning & Development 
• Corporate & Community Services 
 
The WBU sits under the Office of the CEO and is responsible for the planning, delivery, operation and 
maintenance of GRC’s water and sewerage assets. These assets generally include water and sewer 
pipeline networks, pump stations, reservoirs and treatment plants and associated infrastructure 
(including System Control and Advisory Data Acquisition (SCADA) assets). The approximate value of all 









The WBU operates several water schemes across the region including the Gympie/Southside, Cooloola 
Cove/Tin Can Bay, Rainbow Beach, Amamoor, Kandanga, Imbil, Goomeri and Kilkivan schemes (GRC 
2017c). 
 
The scale of water supply operations is indicated by the following figures: 
 
• Properties Serviced by Water: 14930 
• Annual Drinking Water Produced: 3700ML 
• Approximate Water Assets Value: $155M 
• Asset Summary: 
o 8 - Water Treatment Plants 
o 3 - Raw Water Lagoons 
o 3 - Impoundment Weirs 
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o 13 - Raw Water Bores 
o 19 - Drinking Water Reservoirs 
o 432km - Water Mains 









The WBU operates several sewerage schemes across the region including the Gympie/Southside, 
Cooloola Cove, Tin Can Bay, Rainbow Beach, Imbil, Goomeri and Kilkivan schemes (GRC 2016b). 
 
The scale of sewerage supply operations is indicated by the following figures: 
 
• Properties Serviced by Sewerage: 12901 
• Annual Sewerage Treated: 2500ML 
• Approximate Sewerage Assets Value: $183M 
• Asset Summary: 
o 7 - Sewerage Treatment Plants 
o 361km - Sewerage Gravity Mains 
o 61km - Sewerage Pressure Mains 





Figure 1-5: Gympie Sewerage Treatment Plant (GRC 2017c) 
 
 
 Existing Asset Management Approaches 
 
Capital projects and maintenance activities performed by the WBU are generally reactive actions 
following asset failures or issues that require urgent corrective actions. There is currently very little 
preventative maintenance and similarly limited early corrective maintenance. This is generally referred 
to as the Run to Failure (RTF) maintenance method. Without a prioritisation tool it is very difficult to 
implement cost effective maintenance and renewals programs with a limited budget and resources. 
An asset criticality analysis tool will immediately identify and prioritise crucial WBU assets for asset 
management tasks like data collection, condition assessment, preventative maintenance and capital 
renewals, significantly reducing organisational risks (Covaris 2015). 
 
 
1.3 Research Objectives and Brief Methodology 
 
The purpose of this research is to provide the GRC WBU with a software tool and documented 
methodology to calculate an asset criticality score for all of its water and sewerage assets with key 
objectives as follows: 
 
• Creation of a risk-based asset criticality score and prioritisation framework and methodologies 
for water & sewerage infrastructure that align with GRC WBU policies and objectives. 
 
• Development of semi-automated Microsoft Excel software tool that dynamically calculates a 
criticality score based on a range of input criteria and ranks the assets by criticality 
 
• Analysis of the results of the software tool, calibration and re-analysis 
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The process used to achieve these objectives is as follows: 
 
• Perform an in-depth literature review of asset/maintenance management, failure mode 
identification, asset criticality analysis/prioritisation, Multi-Criteria Decision Analysis (MCDA) 
techniques and existing asset criticality analysis frameworks. 
 
• Identify the asset hierarchy, groups and types as defined by WBU to assist with identification 
of failure modes and consequences of failure.  
 
• Develop assessment criteria and framework based on asset failure modes and consequences 
of failure aligned with GRC policies. Use a MCDA methodology to apply criteria weightings to 
each criterion.  
 
• Apply the analysis to a selection of assets across each asset category to test the model. Make 
assumptions where data is unavailable but required for the analysis. Examine results and 
determine differences between calculated results and expectations. 
 
• Calibrate the model based on the initial results analysis and re-test the selection of assets. 
Examine results and determine differences between calculated results and expectations. 
 
1.4 Dissertation Structure 
This dissertation has been arranged into several chapters which are summarised as follows: 
 
Chapter 1 – Introduction 
 
This section is a brief introduction to the dissertation introducing the reader to background 
information on infrastructure asset management, prioritisation techniques using asset criticality, GRC 
and GRC’s water and sewerage infrastructure assets. 
 
Chapter 2 – Literature Review 
 
A literature review focusing on the topics of asset/maintenance management, failure mode 
identification, asset criticality analysis/prioritisation, Multi-Criteria Decision Analysis (MDCA) 
techniques and existing asset criticality analysis frameworks was completed prior to commencing the 
analysis. This formed an integral part of the dissertation. 
 
Chapter 3 – Criticality Analysis Methodology 
 
This section describes the detailed methodology used to create the asset criticality analysis framework 
including discussion around asset hierarchy and grouping, potential failure modes, consequences of 
failure scoring, probability of failure scoring and the calculation of an overall asset criticality score. 
 
Chapter 4 – Overview of Study Sites 
 
This section provides a detailed description and overview of the assets selected from each asset 
category that the developed framework was applied to as part of this dissertation. 
 
Chapter 5 – Application of Criticality Analysis 
This section describes the processes used to apply the criticality scoring framework to passive and 
active asset types. 
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Chapter 6 – Analysis of Results 
Analysis and discussion of the results obtained from the criticality analysis and resulting prioritisation. 
 
Chapter 7 – Conclusions 
Summary of key outcomes, areas for improvement and potential future work. 
 
Chapter 8 – References 








This chapter systematically examines existing research associated with asset/maintenance 
management, failure mode identification, asset criticality analysis/prioritisation, Multi-Criteria 
Decision Analysis (MDCA) techniques and existing asset criticality analysis frameworks.  
 
 
2.2 Local Government Infrastructure Asset Management Background 
 
The Asset Management Council (2014) defines asset management as “The life cycle management of 
physical assets to achieve the stated outputs of the enterprise”. The asset life cycle includes phases of 
planning, acquisition, operation and maintenance, renewal and disposal of assets (Local Government 
Victoria 2015). It is critical that local government organisations know the type, performance, value, 
and age of their assets so that they can make informed decisions regarding maintenance, renewal and 
replacement activities (Queensland Audit Office 2017). 
 
This section of the review discusses the key aspects of asset management and how an Asset Criticality 
Analysis (ACA) tool can support these functions towards meeting the goals of the organisations. 
 
 
 Asset Management Plans 
 
Asset management plans define the strategies, policies, procedures and operational activities 
necessary to realise an organization’s asset management objectives (Life Cycle Engineering 2019). The 
preparation of asset management plans in Queensland are a legislative requirement under the Local 
Government Act 2009 (QLD) and Local Government Regulation 2012 (QLD) which require Council’s to: 
• provide strategies to ensure the sustainable management of assets listed in the organisation’s 
asset register; 
• forecast capital expenditure for renewal and upgrade of assets over a ten-year period; and 
• inform the long-term financial forecast of the organisation. 
 
The IPWEA NAMS International Infrastructure Management Manual (IIMM) covers the suggested 
content of asset management plans in much greater detail. Briefly, this includes strategic, tactical and 





Figure 2-1: The Total Asset Management Process (IPWEA NAMS 2006a) 
 
 
IPWEA NAMS (2006a) state that asset management plans should define an organisations asset 
management policy and align with the organisations strategic plan which is driven by stakeholder 
requirements and expectations. This is referred to by IPWEA NAMS (2006a) as the strategic planning 
component of an asset management plan which consider a 10 to 25-year financial planning horizon 
and defines high-level organisational level of service targets, objectives and strategies to achieve them.  
 
The tactical planning component of an asset management plan involves the application of detailed 
processes, procedures and standards to develop management plans for each unique asset type 
(sometimes referred to as asset class plans) that allocate resources required to achieve the 
organisations objectives. These processes and procedures include (IPWEA NAMS 2006a): 
• Managing asset information database/GIS mapping systems (asset attributes, location, 
condition, risks, value etc.) 
• Risk identification assessment and control 
• Optimised decision making 
• Setting detailed management objectives including technical and stakeholder service levels, 
regulatory compliance and financial performance 
• Asset performance and condition monitoring 
 
Operational planning is the final component of an asset management plan and is typically a short-term 
plan of 1-3 years that focuses on practical achievement rather than visionary planning. IPWEA NAMS 
(2006a) suggest that an effective operational plan can assist with the delivery of defined levels of 
service efficiently, define and measure key performance indicators and promote efficient and 
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innovative service delivery.  This component typically covers the operation and maintenance of assets 
with respect to (IPWEA NAMS 2006a): 
• Implementation of asset solutions – operate, maintain, renew, dispose 
• Implementation of non-asset solutions – demand management, insurance, failure 
management 
• Structure, authority and responsibilities for asset management 
• Personnel Resourcing – skills, experience, competence 
• Stakeholder engagement/communication strategies 
• Information and data control 
• Emergency preparedness and response 
 
An ACA framework is an essential component of an organisations asset management plan, policies and 
procedures. The tool can be used to support many aspects of an asset management plan described 
above including: 
 
• Identifying assets that represent the greatest risk so that controls can be implemented by 
priority 
• Optimised decision making for long/short planning and expenditure 
• Justification of investment into the targeted collection of asset attribute and condition data to 
drive informed decision making 




 Asset Information Database & GIS Mapping 
 
An up-to-date asset database & GIS mapping is the foundation of all asset management practices and 
is critical to inform the organisations decision making processes (IPWEA NAMS 2006a). The asset data 
typically recorded can be summarised as: 
• Unique Identification: identification number allowing tracking of the asset 
• Categorisation: classing/grouping of similar assets with the aim to optimise management 
• Asset attributes: description, material type, size, length, age etc. 
• Financial attributes: replacement cost, depreciation, written down value (WDV) etc. 
• Asset condition/serviceability: scoring of the assets physical condition and functionality to 
provide its intended service 
 
The reliability of an ACA is highly dependent upon the quality and extent of available asset data. 
However, asset data can be complex and costly to time-effectively manage leading to a lack of 
resources being allocated and delays in data updates. 
 
 
 Asset Condition Assessment 
 
Asset condition assessment data is essential for prioritising the maintenance and renewal of assets and 
can improve the prediction of the failure of assets, reducing risks to the organisation (IPWEA NAMS 
2006a). The process typically used is the visual assessment of an asset and scoring of its condition on 
a 1 to 5 scale by an operator experienced with the asset. A score of 1 suggests that the asset is in very 
good condition, a score of 5 represents unserviceable or imminent failure and those in between 
represent varying levels of asset degradation (IPWEA NAMS 2006a). An example scoring guide is 
provided in Figure 2-2. A more detailed approach to scoring that organisations with mature asset 
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management practices could use is detailed in Figure 2-3. The extra granularity greatly improves the 








Figure 2-3: Detailed Approach to Condition Assessment Scoring (IPWEA NAMS 2006b) 
 
 
A simplified desktop method of performing this assessment considers the actual age of an asset against 
its design life and assigns a condition score based on remaining life. While this requires minimal data, 
asset degradation is not typically linear and will have several renewal interventions within its lifetime 
bringing it back to a higher condition (IPWEA NAMS 2006a). Assets might also operate longer than 
expected without degradation, continuously fail without warning, or fail unpredictably (e.g. 





Figure 2-4: Example Asset Degradation Curve (Global Mass Transit 2018) 
 
 
IPWEA NAMS (2006a) have developed frameworks for typical infrastructure assets that detail 
condition assessment and have advocated the importance of condition assessment as part of asset 
management practices in the IIMM. Other asset standard authorities like the Water Services 
Association of Australia (WSAA) have developed similar frameworks for water and sewerage assets 
such as the WSA 05-2013 Conduit Inspection Reporting Code of Australia standardising condition 
assessment of sewer mains. The key to consistent and valid condition assessment is the use of these 
frameworks or guidelines that set out clear descriptions that allow an inexperienced user to assess. 
 
Asset condition assessment is critical for the incorporation of likelihood of failure into an ACA. This has 
been discussed in more detail in sections 2.3.4 and 2.3.5. 
 
 
 Asset Maintenance Management 
 
There are three main approaches used in maintenance management which offer differing levels of 
value for money depending on the asset (Gandhare & Akarte 2012, Bevilacqua & Braglia 2000). These 
approaches are covered in the following sections. 
 
 
2.2.4.1 Corrective Maintenance (CM) 
 
Gandhare & Akarte (2012) define CM as a strategy when an asset is operated without maintenance 
until failure. This strategy is also referred to as “run-to-failure”. Gandhare & Akarte (2012) and 
Bevilacqua & Braglia (2000) suggest that this strategy is appropriate for low cost, readily 
sourced/replaced, process redundant and non-critical assets where the cost of maintenance would 
exceed the cost to replace or repair the asset following failure. 
 
Contrary to this, CM can also be the most in-efficient and costly form of maintenance for critical assets 
where their failure may cause (Mobley 2002): 
 
• loss of ability to provide services for extended periods of time, 
• domino effect of asset failures, 
• increased repair times, complexity and cost, 
• unavailability or delayed procurement of replacements/spares, 
• stakeholder/regulatory non-compliance; and 
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• other undesirable impacts to the organisation. 
 
Bevilacqua & Braglia (2000) and Bertling et al. (2005) determined that an evaluation of reliability and 
economic value (e.g. cost of failure, cost of preventative maintenance, cost of interruption) to 
determine if an asset is suitable for corrective maintenance.  
 
An asset criticality analysis can identify low risk assets suitable for a corrective maintenance approach. 
 
 
2.2.4.2 Preventative Maintenance (PM) 
 
According to Bevilacqua & Braglia (2000) PM is based on an asset’s failure mode and reliability 
characteristics where historic failure data suggests that a scheduled maintenance program can 
increase the operational time of an asset and avoid failure. This can be in the form of a periodic 
maintenance schedule (i.e 12-month service, 6-weekly bearing lubrication etc.), based on component 
usage (i.e replace pump bearings after 1000 hours as they typically fail at 1200) or other similar 
maintenance activities aimed toward avoiding failure by maintaining at risk components (Gandhare & 
Akarte 2012). The most common example of PM is servicing a car, which is typically based on a time 
period (e.g. 6/12 months), or usage (e.g. 15,000km intervals). 
 
PM requires money and resources to implement and will not always prevent or even reduce the risk 
of asset failure. Gandhare & Akarte (2012) suggest that PM is dependent on the available data and 
accurate failure frequency predictions of the asset operators/maintenance personnel. There is also 
some inherit loss with PM as when an asset component is replaced, the remaining life of that 
component up to failure is lost (Mobley, 2002). As an example, replacing pump bearings at 1000 hours 
when they typically fail at 1200 hours is a loss of 200 hours running time without cost. On the other 
hand, they could also fail at 50 hours after replacement and cause unplanned asset failure which is the 
main risk of PM. 
 
PM is best applied to assets with regular failure frequencies that can be prevented with maintenance. 
For critical assets, where asset failure and downtime results in significant impacts to an organisation 
the cost of asset failure can far outweigh the cost of PM and its resulting asset reliability (Bertling et 
al. 2005). Gandhare & Akarte (2012) note that even with a preventative approach some asset failures 
may occur due to uncertainty of failure frequency and random failures. For this reason, PM is not 
reccomended for assets that have random failure frequencies such as electrical switchboards and 
SCADA systems. 
 
An asset criticality analysis can identify high to medium risk assets which can then be considered from 
a failure mode/frequency perspective to determine if PM is an appropriate approach. 
 
 
2.2.4.3 Predictive Maintenance (PdM) 
 
PdM is the least common approach to maintenance due to its resource and cost intensive 
requirements. Mobley (2002) defines PdM as an approach that uses data analysis techniques like 
vibration monitoring, oil analysis and thermography to detect symptoms of asset failure before they 
occur. This detailed monitoring allows assets to be used for as long as possible with maintenance able 
to be performed just prior to failure, maximising efficiency (Bevilacqua & Braglia 2000). 
 
Mustakerov & Borissova (2013) suggest that PdM should be driven by detailed condition monitoring 
but acknowledge that this requires costly technologies, expert knowledge and effective 
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communication and analysis of data. While costly, this can enable timely decisions regarding the 
maintenance of critical assets. 
 
PdM is best applied to assets that have failure modes that can be predicted, are critical for operation 
and where the cost of failure is significantly more than the cost of regular condition monitoring. An 
example of appropriate PdM is the vibration monitoring of a high- cost water treatment plant supply 
pump while continuous thermography of a non-critical pump would likely cost more than the cost of 
replacement. 
 
An asset criticality analysis can identify high to extreme risk assets which can then be considered from 
an economical condition monitoring perspective to determine if PdM is an appropriate approach. 
 
 
2.3 Asset Criticality Analysis (ACA) 
 
An asset criticality analysis (ACA) is defined by Tranter (2016) as the examination of an asset to 
determine the consequences, probability and detectability of its failure. Typically applied to a database 
of assets, Covaris (2015) and Tileston (2016) define asset criticality as the scoring of an asset with 
respect to the consequence and likelihood of its failure when assessed against multiple weighted 
criteria that align with an organisations objectives and risk policies. The assessment criteria are usually 
customised to suit an organisation but typically include financial, environmental, health & safety, level 
of service/performance, political/reputation and regulatory impacts (Jafari et al. 2014). The outcome 
of an ACA is a unique criticality score for each asset which allows ranking of multiple assets when 
assessed against the same set of criteria. This ranking allows the prioritisation of critical assets (i.e 
assets highly likely to fail with severe consequences) over non-critical assets (i.e low probability of 
failure with no consequences) with respect to the objectives of the organisation (Smith & Mobley 
2008).  
 
Jafari et al. (2014) suggest that an ACA can be used to help organisations prioritise expenditure on 
critical assets with regards to activities such as maintenance, renewals, replacements or upgrades 
which have significant financial and resource impacts on an organisation. This is particularly crucial for 
efficient maintenance management practices like Preventative and Predictive Maintenance which are 
expensive to implement but are effective when applied to highly critical assets (Saarinen, Tavallaey, & 
Westerlund 2013). 
 
There have been several critical asset failures that have happened in Australia that highlight the 
importance of performing an ACA. In 2019 at Walgett in NSW, an electrical switchboard controlling the 
water treatment plants water bore failed, which was the only available water source in ongoing 
drought conditions (Thackray 2019). This led to the water storage reservoir dropping to 25% capacity 
even with conserve water notification to the community and took two days to rectify. While electrical 
faults are hard to predict, no spare components were available on site for such a critical piece of 
equipment. Had an ACA been completed, this risk may have been identified and a spare component 
or alternative solution in place. 
 
In 2008 at Varanus Island off the coast of WA, the key export main transferring gas over 100km to the 
mainland ruptured, causing an explosion within the gas production plant and significantly damaging 
the infrastructure (Gosch 2008). The plant was responsible for the production of over 30% of the WA 
state gas supply and was offline for several months, significantly affecting the WA and Australian 
economy and threatened the unprecedented use of emergency political powers to control the energy 
supply industry (Megalogenis & Tasker 2008). An investigation by the National Offshore Petroleum 
Safety Authority (NOPSA) (2008) found that the pipeline failed due to external corrosion caused by 
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ineffective anti-corrosion measures and that there was ineffective inspection and monitoring of the 
affected gas pipeline. In this scenario the results of an ACA could have been used to help justify 
investment into an inspection and maintenance program for the pipeline. 
 
Based on the available literature reviewed, the typical process used to perform an ACA is (Atkinson 
1998, Healy 2006, Press 2008): 
1. Identify asset failure modes, hazards and risks 
2. Determine consequences and severity of failure across a set of assessment criteria specific to 
the organisation 
3. Determine the probability of failure occurring, utilising asset condition data where available 
4. Calculation of the overall weighted criticality score with respect to the consequence and 
probability of failure for each criterion using a consistent methodology 
 
Contradictory to the above, Olsen (2015) found that probability/likelihood of failure was not always 
considered when performing an ACA and referenced supporting literature by IPWEA NAMS (2011), 
Pschierer-Barnfather et al. (2011) and Chandima Ratnayake (2014).  
 
Literature by Jaderi et al. (2014), Seifeddine (2003), WERF (2010), Shoalhaven Water (2013), Park et al. 
(2010), Meridium (2017) and Mierau (2014) all used risk-based processes including probability of 
failure as the foundation of their ACA literature and has therefore been considered further in this 




Figure 2-5: Example of Asset Criticality Assessment Process (Dinmohammadi et al. 2016) 
 
 
While risk assessment appears to be a common component of an ACA, Márquez (2007) suggests that 
there are several sub-methodologies such as qualitative techniques, quantitative techniques, and 
multi-criteria decision analysis techniques that enhance the utility of the analysis. These 




 Qualitative vs. Quantitative Approach 
 
Depending on the level of data available to an organisation, a qualitative, semi-quantitative or 
quantitative approach may be used throughout the ACA process when assessing failure modes, 
consequences and severity and probability/likelihood of failure (Healy 2006, Press 2003, Minnaar et 
al. 2013).  
 
 
2.3.1.1 Qualitative Approach 
 
Anderson (2010) defines a qualitive approach as the collection, analysis and interpretation of data not 
easily translated to a number such as interview questionnaires or images. In the case of an ACA, a 
qualitative approach could be used when there is no available data on failure modes, impacts of failure 
or rates of failure (Department of the Army 2006). However, without reliable data this method relies 
on the experience of personnel using the assets to determine failure modes, consequences of failure 
and likelihood of failure. Anderson (2010) suggests that while qualitive approaches may be negatively 
affected by small scale data, anecdotal evidence and bias, the outcomes can also be unbiased and 
credible if carried out with a rigorous framework. 
 
Atkinson (1998) found that a qualitative approach is considerably less complex than a quantitative 
approach while achieving similar results and was appropriate for an initial hazard identification in high 
risk scenarios prior to quantitative assessment.  Atkinson (1998) also developed a generic methodology 
provided in Figure 2-6 which guides the development of a systematic framework in the approach to 
minimise bias and maximise credibility. Healy (2006) theorised that an initial assessment would 






Figure 2-6: Example ACA Methodology Utilising a Qualitative Approach (Atkinson 1998) 
 
 
2.3.1.2 Quantitative Approach 
 
A quantitative approach to ACA can be used when failure modes, impacts of failure and rates of failure 
have been reliably recorded and are available for interrogation (Department of the Army 2006). This 
approach is most commonly used in factories that have large numbers of similar equipment/machinery 
that can be monitored for failure data.  The significant disadvantage of quantitative based criticality 
assessment is that it requires investment into long term data collection and analysis and accurate 
assumptions to be reliable. Healy (2006) suggests that a quantitative approach is impractical without 
historic data which can be difficult to obtain and often requires pre-processing to attain a form suitable 
for analysis. Atkinson (1998) found that while quantitative approaches had more consistent and 
credible results, they were significantly more complicated and resource intensive and generally more 
applicable to high risk/critical asset operations. 
 
Research by Minnaar et al. (2013) described 14 different quantitative data analysis techniques for asset 
management including ACA, suggesting that a quantitative approach was the most applicable to 
numerical based decision-making. The Mean Time Between Failure (MTBF) was one approach 
described that demonstrated failure patterns in historic data allowing maintenance activities to be 
programmed prior to predicted failure, maximising efficient and minimising asset downtime (Minnaar 
et al. 2013). Olsen (2015) found that the key advantage of a quantitative approach was that the results 
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were explicit, consistent and credible however similar to a qualitative analysis, a systematic framework 
should be implemented to ensure consistent data collection and calculations. 
 
 
2.3.1.3 Semi-Quantitative Approach 
 
A semi-quantitative approach utilises a mixture of both qualitative and quantitative data sources which 
is thought to be the most practical with reliable results if implemented with a systematic framework 
(Healy 2006). The key advantage of this approach it that it allows numerical historic data-based 
calculations to be used for relevant aspects, while qualitative techniques can also be used to translate 
non-numerical aspects or aspects with little to no historical data. Many organisations end up utilising 




 ACA Step 1: Risk/Hazard Analysis 
 
A risk/hazard analysis considers the potential failures of an asset/component producing a list of risks 
and their consequences (Hastings 2010). Several hazard analysis methodologies exist including 
(Hastings 2010): 
 
• Hazard and Operability Analysis (HAZOP) 
• Failure Mode and Effects Analysis (FMEA) 
• Reliability Centred Maintenance (RCM) 
• Risk Based Inspection (RBI) 
 
Utilisation of a hazard analysis methodology is essential to consistently assess the risk of failure across 
an infrastructure portfolio and is crucial for an effective ACA (Atkinson 1998). Failure to identify 
significant risks at the start of the process could undermine the reliability of an ACA and lead to critical 
assets being ignored as low risk as a mode of failure hasn’t been considered. 
 
The FMEA methodology was considered the most appropriate based on GRC’s scenario and has been 
considered in further detail due to the accessibility of its extensive implementation literature and 
widespread usage by organisations in asset management activities and ACA. 
 
 
2.3.2.1 Failure Mode and Effects Analysis (FMEA) 
 
A Failure Mode and Effects Analysis (FMEA) is a framework tool developed to analyse equipment 
failures and was one of the first techniques used as an approach to failure analysis. FMEA was originally 
developed by the US military for a range of uses including mission and premature equipment failure 
among other applications (Deighton 2016). The typical process for FMEA is for a team of technical 
experts or asset operators to consider every possible failure mode, the effect/consequence of the 
failure and single points of failure that are critical to the asset. An optional second step to perform a 
Failure Mode and Effects Criticality Analysis (FMECA) is done by ranking each failure mode according 
to its criticality when compared with other failure modes (Lipol & Haq 2011). 
 
Lipol & Haq (2011) outline the general FMEA/FMECA methodology as involving the following steps: 
• Identify potential failure modes for a product or process. 
• Assess the risk associated with those failure modes and prioritize issues for corrective action. 
• Identify and carry out corrective actions to address the most serious concerns. 
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An example FMEA assessment diagram visualising the first and second points of the methodology is 




Figure 2-7: Example FMEA Process Diagram (US EPA 2016) 
 
 
While FMEA and FMECA was originally intended for systems, process and design phases, it is also highly 
useful for the assessment of existing systems such as infrastructure assets. It provides a consistent 
framework to determine a comprehensive list of failure modes for an ACA and minimises human bias 
in the process (Lipol & Haq 2011). 
 
 
 ACA Step 2: Consequence of Failure and Severity 
 
Following the identification of risks of failure, assessment of the consequence and severity of failure is 
a technique that can be used to categorise the level of risk. WERF (2010) defines consequence of failure 
as “the outcome of an asset failure expressed either qualitatively or quantitatively, being a loss, injury, 
or disadvantage from a social, economic and environmental or regulatory standpoint”. The assessment 
criteria are typically customised to suit an organisation and the specific type of asset. The 
consequences are typically ranked or categorised for each criterion in terms of their severity which is 
defined by Ayyub (2003) as the significance or intensity of the consequence. 
 
An example of a consequence and severity scoring table developed Capacity Infrastructure Services 
(CIS) (2018) (the water, sewerage and stormwater authority for Wellington City and Hutt City councils) 
is presented in Figure 2-8. The table defines a range of severity scores and a set of criteria specific to 
the organisation that are impacted as a result of the consequence. Each severity score has been 
descriptively or numerically defined for each criterion to ensure consistent assessment of 
consequences and their severity. Each criterion is scored separately (e.g. a major score in financial 
impact does not necessarily mean there is a major environmental impact) but there are typically some 
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Figure 2-8: Consequence Definition Table (CIS 2018) 
 
 
Not all criteria will necessarily be considered equal by an organisation (WERF 2010). To take this into 
account, each criterion is typically weighted and the product of the weighted scores is considered the 
overall consequence of failure severity score for that asset (WERF 2010, Asset Insights 2013). Asset 
Insights (2013) acknowledge that the weighting of each criteria can be subjective or biased depending 
on the organisation and its stakeholders and is something to consider when developing the weighting. 
An example methodology behind the weighting of criteria is discussed further in section 2.3.6. 
 
Huges et al. (2009) suggest that sometimes the failure of an asset may result in a range of different 
outcomes from minor repair, disruptive failure to catastrophic failure which is not captured by an 
overall score. Huges et al. (2009) note that implementing this into an ACA is more complex and suggest 
that an average probability of each failure mode could be used to determine the overall severity and 
likelihood of failure with more accurate results. 
 
 
 ACA Step 3: Probability/Likelihood of Failure 
 
While an asset may have severe consequences if it fails, the likelihood of failure is an important factor 
in determining its criticality. A key example is a concrete tank structure of a reservoir with a typical 
design life of 100 years. While it is highly critical to the performance of the network (i.e. water storage) 
the chance of the asset having a major failure within the first 50-75 years is extremely low. Without 
considering likelihood of failure, the asset would rank highly in terms of criticality from day one and 
costly maintenance procedures and renewal works may be suggested without need. 
 
WERF (2010) define the likelihood of failure as the expected possibility of failure occurring based on 
history or known performance of the particular asset. Huges et al. (2009) suggest that a typical 
assessment of likelihood of failure involves analysing the asset operators and collective industry 
knowledge and experience relating to degradation, failure, condition assessment and performance to 
define the likelihood of failure when an asset reaches a certain condition score (discussed in section 
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The key disadvantage to incorporating likelihood of failure into an ACA is that if asset condition is 
scored on a small whole number scale such as 1-5 there is insufficient granularity between the 
probabilities of failure (i.e. only 5 possibilities rather than up to 100). This means that when an ACA is 
applied to the data base, assets with similar failure modes and condition scores may score equally 
overall, preventing the assets from being individually prioritised. 
 
As discussed briefly in section 2.3 and 2.5 and in contradiction of the above, not incorporating 
likelihood of failure can also result in similar equal asset criticality scores that prevent prioritisation of 
individual assets. Based on this, the ACA implementation should be a process of continuous 
improvement in detail over time as data collection matures and trends and patterns are identified. 
 
 
 ACA Step 4: Risk-based Criticality Analysis Methodology 
 
Risk management has continued to grow in importance to organisations as insurance and litigation 
issues and liabilities become more common. The majority of mature organisations have a risk 
management policy which is based on the aligned Australian and International Standard AS ISO 31000 
or AS/NZS 4360 (now superseded). A key section of the standard is the discussion of the risk 
assessment elements of identification, analysis, evaluation, treatment and monitoring (Australian 
Standards 2018). The risk assessment framework provides a consistent approach to the assessment of 
risks and development of controls to eliminate or minimise the level of risk. The process involves 
scoring identified risks based on the consequence and probability of them occurring before and after 
controls have been implemented to determine the level of residual risk (Australian Standards 2018). A 
tool developed to assist with the scoring is called a risk matrix with an example shown in Figure 2-10. 
A common usage of a risk matrix in organisations is the regulatory assessment of high-risk work 
activities (Queensland Government 2011). Typically risks that are still assessed as “High” even after 
controls have been implemented are considered unacceptable and the activity must not be allowed to 
occur (Gaidow & Boey 2005). In the case of asset criticality, identified risks are assets already in the 
field and operating which highlights the importance of implementing critical maintenance or renewal 
actions to reduce the assessed level of risk. By combining the risks and consequences identified in steps 
1 and 2 of a typical ACA (sections 2.3.2 and 2.3.3), an assets worst failure consequence can be 
identified. A risk-based ACA combines an assets worst consequence with the likelihood (discussed in 
section 2.3.4) of that consequence occurring (Márquez 2007).  
 
There are two key approaches to a risk-based ACA which use either quantitative or qualitative data as 
discussed in section 2.3.1. The quantitative approach relies on measurable consequence quantities 
such as cost, volumes or exceedances and a range of numerical or percentage-based likelihoods. The 
use of quantitative (numerical) data is less likely to be influenced by bias if used appropriately and 
assists with consistent assessment. The qualitative approach (words) doesn’t require any other input 
data but requires the assessor to be experienced and conscientiously aware of minimising bias to give 
accurate results. An inexperienced assessor may inadvertently under or over score a particular 
consequence resulting in poor confidence in the results and unrealised risks to the organisation. An 





Figure 2-10: Example Risk Matrix with Qualitative & Quantitative Descriptors (Zhang et al. 2017) 
 
 
The key difference of a risk-based ACA is that the results are dynamic rather than static as the likelihood 
of failure will change with maintenance/renewal activities or updated condition assessment (WERF 
2007). This greatly improves the usefulness of the criticality ranking. As risks are slowly eliminated or 
reduced their criticality score is also reduced and they rank lower, making a new set of assets the top 
priority. With unlimited time and resources this process could be repeated until a desired level of 
service (i.e. maximum asset condition score of 3) can be achieved and maintained (IPWEA NAMS 
2006a). 
 
The main disadvantage of this approach is that the system needs to be constantly updated with revised 
likelihood of failure which requires increased time, resources and budgets. Without updates assets 
that have since been upgraded or maintained will still be prioritised highly, reducing the usefulness of 
the ACA tool. Further, the accuracy of an assets probability of failure has a significant influence on the 
effectiveness on the ACA prioritisation. To overcome these disadvantages, the ACA is most effective 
as a live system where updated condition scoring is input against an asset database and ranking 
instantly and automatically recalculated within the system. 
 
 
 ACA Step 4: Multi-Criteria Decision Analysis Criticality Analysis Methodology 
 
Multi-Criteria Decision Analysis (MDCA) or Decision Making (MDCM) is a group of 
methodologies/techniques that are used to rank the performance of alternative decision options 
against multiple criteria and their subjective importance to the decision maker (Pavan & Todeschini 
2009, DCLG 2009). When mathematics is applied to this process, decisions that are normally intangible 
and subjective are able to be quantified and prioritised (Pavan & Todeschini 2009). Pavan & Todeschini 
(2009), DCLG (2009) and NRLI (2011) state that MDCA can be used to break down a complex problem 
into smaller simpler components, establishing importance or priority to rank the alternative decisions 
of each component before combining the results to present an overall comparison of each alternative. 
 
There are many alternative methodologies and techniques that fall under the term of MCDA including 
(Kabir, Sadiq & Tesfamariam 2014, Kumar et al. 2017): 
 
• AHP – Analytical Hierarchy Process by Saaty 1980 
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• ELECTRE – ELimination Et Choix Traduisant la REalite by Benayoun et al. 1966 
• MAUT – Multi-Attribute Utility Theory by Edwards and Newman 1982 
• PROMETHEE – Preference Ranking Organisation Method for Enrichment Evaluations by Brans 
and Vincke 1985 
• TOPSIS – Technique for Order of Preference by Similarity to Ideal Solution by Hwang and Yoon 
1981 
• VIKOR – Vlse Kriterijumska Optimizacija Kompromisno Resenje by Opricovic 1998 
• WPM – Weighted Product Model by Bridgman 1922 
• WSM – Weighted Sum Model by Fishburn in 1967 
 
The AHP methodology was considered the most appropriate based on GRC’s scenario and has been 
considered in further detail due to its ease of use, extensive literature, literature accessibility and 
widespread usage in research (Saaty 2008). 
 
 
2.3.6.1 Analytical Hierarchy Process 
 
The Analytic Hierarchy Process (AHP) originally created by Saaty (1980) is a process used to assist with 
complex decision making. By reducing complex decisions to a series of pairwise comparisons, and then 
synthesizing the results, the AHP helps capture both subjective and objective aspects of a decision 
(Mocenni 2006, Márquez 2007). AHP is a methodology that can be applied when problems require 
consideration of both quantitative and qualitative data, which is relevant to performing an ACA 
(Handfield et al. 2002). 
 
In an ACA there are many criteria that need to be considered, with some considered more important 
than others. The criteria considered and comparative weighting defined will always be unique to 
different organisations which highlights the usefulness of the AHP methodology in that it can produce 
a similar result (i.e. asset criticality score) with many different decisions made to get there. Along with 
several alternative decision-making scenarios, Bhushan & Rai (2004) state that the AHP is appropriate 
to be used for prioritisation of alternatives which aligns with the goals of an ACA. 
 
Saaty (2008) defined the AHP in four broad steps which have been considered with respect to 
performing an ACA: 
 
1. Define the problem and determine the kind of knowledge sought (i.e. goal, objective). 
 
While it may be considered an obvious step, the importance of setting a clear achievable goal can’t 
be dismissed and is generally the key to most successful research. For an ACA in the context of 
infrastructure assets, the goal would be to determine a numerical score for each asset that allows 
them to be ranked and prioritised in terms of criticality to the organisation. 
 
2. Structure the decision hierarchy from the top with the goal of the decision, then the objectives 
from a broad perspective, through the intermediate levels (criteria on which subsequent 
elements depend) to the lowest level (which usually is a set of the alternatives). 
 
The AHP requires that a hierarchy of criteria and sub criteria are defined that are relevant to 
achieving the goal. Saaty (1980) suggested that one way to develop the hierarchy is to work down 
from the goal as far as possible, and then back up from the alternatives until links and relationships 
are made in such a way that comparisons can be made. Bhushan & Rai (2004) developed a diagram 
(see Figure 2-11) to visualise these relationships and demonstrate how each alternative is 
considered against each criteria to achieve the goal. 
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3. Construct a set of pairwise comparison matrices. Each element in an upper level is used to 
compare the elements in the level immediately below with respect to it. 
 
Once the hierarchy is defined, it is clear there are a number of criteria to consider and decisions to 
make. Bevilacqua & Braglia (2000) state that pairwise comparisons allow the analysis of only two 
factors at once which greatly simplifies the decision-making process. The criteria are considered in 
a series of pairwise “judgements” to determine how many times more important or dominant one 
element is over another (Saaty 2008). Saaty (2008), Bhushan & Rai (2004) and Márquez (2007) 
agree that this should be done using a scale between equal importance and extreme importance 
and assigning numerical scoring of 1 to 9 to facilitate matrix calculations with the results. The scale 




Figure 2-13: Example Pairwise Comparison Judgement Scale (Saaty 2008) 
 
 
With respect to an ACA each set of two or more criteria/sub-criteria would be judged in pairs. 
Referring to Figure 2-12 and Figure 2-13, environmental impact may be considered strongly more 
important financial impact and therefore might receive a pairwise judgement score of 5. 
Conversely, financial impact would receive a pairwise judgement score of 1/5 when considered 
against environmental impact. This process results in a 𝑛 ×  𝑛 matrix 𝐴 when 𝑛 is the number of 
criteria being compared (Saaty 1980, Mocenni 2006). 
 
4. Use the priorities obtained from the comparisons to weigh the priorities in the level 
immediately below. Do this for every element. Then for each element in the level below add its 
28 
weighed values and obtain its overall or global priority. Continue this process of weighing and 
adding until the final priorities of the alternatives in the bottom most level are obtained. 
 
Once the matrix 𝐴 is defined, a normalised pairwise comparison matrix 𝐴𝑛𝑜𝑟𝑚 is determined by 








 (Equation 1) 
 
Where: 
𝑛 = the size of the matrix (i.e. 𝑛 × 𝑛) 
𝑎𝑗𝑘 = the j
th x kth entry in the matrix 𝐴 
𝑎𝑙𝑘 = the sum of 𝑎𝑗𝑘 for each k
th column 
?̅?𝑗𝑘 = the j
th x kth normalised entry in the matrix 𝐴𝑛𝑜𝑟𝑚 
 
 
The criteria weight vector 𝑤𝑗 of the matrix is the numerical relationship or priority of each criteria 








 (Equation 2) 
 
Where: 
𝑛 = the size of the matrix (i.e. 𝑛 × 𝑛) 
?̅?𝑗𝑙  = the sum of 𝑎𝑗𝑙  for each j
th row 
𝑤𝑗 = the criteria weight vector 
 
 
The AHP also utilises a technique called a Consistency Index (CI) to check the consistency of the 
pairwise comparison judgments made. This helps to avoid scenarios where the first element is 
judged more important than the second, the second more important than the third, but the third 
judged more important than the first (i.e. inconsistent with other judgements) (Saaty 1980, 
Mocenni 2006). Saaty (1980) proved that for a consistent reciprocal matrix, the largest eigen value 
is equal to the size of the matrix (i.e 𝜆𝑚𝑎𝑥 = 𝑛 and 𝐶𝐼 = 0). Equation 3 uses this theory to 






 (Equation 3) 
 
Where: 
𝜆𝑚𝑎𝑥 = the maximum eigen value 
𝑛 = the size of the matrix (i.e. 𝑛 × 𝑛) 
𝐶𝐼 = Consistency Index 
 
 
The Consistency Ratio (CR) is then determined as shown in Equation 4 by dividing CI by a constant 
Random Consistency Index (RI) detailed in Table 2-2 (Saaty 1980). Saaty (1980) stated that a CR 
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Karthikeyan et al. (2016) summarised that the literature review suggested that the pairwise 
judgements are specifically subject to the past experience of the judgement decision maker and are 
ultimately subject to inadvertent flawed bias. This highlights the need for judgements to be made by 
a panel of experts where possible and peer reviewed to minimise impacts of bias. While this can be 
seen negatively, it also allows an organisation to truly customise the results to suit their beliefs and 
requirements.  
 
Overall the AHP approach appears to be a suitable approach to performing an ACA with few 
disadvantages that can be controlled with proper consideration. 
 
 
2.4 Existing Criticality Analysis Frameworks 
 
While performing the literature review several existing water and sewerage ACA frameworks for 
various organisations were identified including the framework that developed the idea for this 
dissertation. The implementation and general structure of these frameworks have been considered in 
the development of this dissertation’s ACA framework. 
 
• Development and Execution of Asset Criticality Framework: A Study of Water and Wastewater 
Infrastructure at Toowoomba Regional Council by Olsen 2015 
• Asset Management Plan - Water Supply by Shoalhaven Water 2013 
• Risk-Based Asset Prioritization of Water Transmission/Distribution Pipes for the City of Tampa 
by Park et al. 2010 
• Use of Criticality and Risk to Identify Wellington Region’s Key Three Water Assets by Capacity 
Infrastructure Services (CIS) 2018 
 
 
2.5 Areas of Controversy 
 
Following an extensive literature review it is clear that there are multiple approaches to performing an 
asset criticality analysis but the approaches generally follow a similar process as discussed in section 
2.3 (Atkinson 1998, Healy 2006, Press 2008). The key controversy in available literature is whether the 
probability of failure should be considered (i.e. risk-based criticality) or not (i.e. consequence-based 
criticality) in an ACA. This was clear in the abundance of literature for determining consequence-based 
criticality for assigning appropriate approaches to maintenance management in large 
factories/industries and limited literature regarding risk-based ACA for infrastructure assets. 
 
As discussed in section 2.3, Olsen (2015) found that probability/likelihood of failure was not always 
considered when performing an ACA and referenced supporting literature by IPWEA NAMS (2011), 
Pschierer-Barnfather et al. (2011) and Chandima Ratnayake (2014). Based on these findings, Olsen 
(2015) developed a static consequence-based ACA and did not consider probability of failure. 
Contradicting this, literature by Jaderi et al. (2014), Seifeddine (2003), WERF (2010), Shoalhaven Water 
(2013), Park et al. (2010), Meridium (2017) and Mierau (2014) all used risk-based processes including 
probability of failure as the foundation of their ACA literature. Due to the dynamic prioritisation 
capabilities of a risk-based ACA this has been used in the framework developed by this dissertation. 
 
This uncertainty around the inclusion of probability of failure appears to be due to: 
• Lack of clear definition, standard and methodology specifically for performing an ACA 
• Adaptation by organisations to suit their specific objectives, risks and requirements 
• Different objectives in what is desired as an outcome. For example, some organisations may 
only require consequence-based criticality to set broad policies and guidelines (i.e. 
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2.6 Chapter Summary 
 
This chapter systematically examined existing literature and background information associated with 
asset/maintenance management, failure mode identification, asset criticality analysis/prioritisation, 
Multi-Criteria Decision Analysis (MDCA) techniques, existing asset criticality analysis frameworks and 
areas of controversy. 
 
Four broad steps to performing an ACA were identified that were consistent across literature reviewed 
and scrutinized in detail throughout the chapter: 
 
1. Identify asset failure modes, hazards and risks 
 
Several methodologies for failure mode identification and risk assessment essential to perform 
this step were identified in literature with FMEA methodology being considered in detail. 
 
2. Determine consequences and severity of failure across a set of assessment criteria specific to 
the organisation 
 
Consequence and severity scoring approaches identified were generally consistent in using a 
qualitative or quantitative matrix format however the assessment criteria developed was always 
unique due to its specific adaptation to an organisation or usage. 
 
3. Determine the probability of failure occurring, utilising asset condition data where available 
 
While literature talked about the advantages of incorporating probability of failure in an ACA, 
limited approaches and methodologies were identified to convert asset condition data into a 
probability of failure scoring. This is an area that could be considered in future research. 
 
4. Calculation of the overall weighted criticality score with respect to the consequence and 
probability of failure for each criterion using a consistent methodology 
 
The majority of literature used score weighting techniques to obtain more accurate results. 
Multiple MCDA techniques were identified with the AHP methodology considered in more detail 
based on its applicability to weighting scoring according to criteria importance. 
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 Criticality Analysis Methodology 
 
3.1 Introduction 
A robust supporting framework and methodology is essential to ensuring consistent and reliable 
results. The following steps taken, and processes used were generally in alignment with existing 
Criticality Analysis frameworks reviewed as part of Chapter 2. In this chapter the following aspects are 
discussed: 
 
• Available data sources 
• Identification of asset classes and categories specific to GRC 
• Determination of asset failure modes and effects using a high level Failure Modes and Effects 
Analysis (FMEA) 
• Development of consequence criteria based on identified asset failure modes  
• Development of Consequence of Failure criteria and weightings aligning with GRC’s Risk 
Management Framework and utilising the Analytical Hierarchy Process (AHP) 
• Development of Consequence of Failure severity scoring definitions for each criteria 
• Development of Probability of Failure scoring definitions based on asset condition data or 
asset age 
• Development of Overall Asset Criticality Score based on Consequence of Failure and 
Probability of Failure 
• Creation of a semi-automated spreadsheet calculation tool to process large numbers of assets 
and generate both a Consequence of Failure Score and a risk based Overall Criticality Score, 
allowing prioritisation 
 
3.2 Available Data Sources 
 
The quality and availability of asset management data sources is critical for the development of an ACA 
framework. Without considering available input data and output format requirements the framework 
will be unusable. GRC utilise and maintain several software systems for asset management purposes 
which include: 
 
• Assetic Asset Management System (AMS) 
• Intramaps/MapInfo/QGIS Geographic Information Systems (GIS) 
• ClearSCADA and Citect Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) systems 
 
Each source has different levels of quality, accessibility and usability for the purposes of this study. A 
short summary and description of each system has been provided in the following sections. 
 
 
 Assetic AMS 
 
Assetic is the asset management software used by GRC which includes data register, financial valuation 
and maintenance management components and integrates with the GIS to show assets spatially. The 
data register contains unique entries for each asset which records the details and history of current 
and disposed assets in terms of attributes and financial valuation. The maintenance management 
component was in the process of being procured at the time of this report and was therefore not able 
to be used to determine historic failure and maintenance data. 
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For the purposes of the ACA, the data register was used as the foundation input data and drove the 
output format. The financial valuation information was also used to assist with measuring 
consequence severity as discussed in section 3.6. 
 
 
Figure 3-1: Assetic AMS User Interface 
 
 
 IntraMaps/MapInfo/QGIS GIS 
 
IntraMaps is a GIS user interface software used by GRC to provide access to spatial data to its 
employees, consultants, developers and the general public. MapInfo is a GIS backend software which 
is used by GRC to maintain the database that holds asset and spatial data. Due to the cost of MapInfo 
licences and accessibility outside of GRC the freely available QGIS GIS software has been used. 
 
For the purposes of the ACA, QGIS allows the execution of spatial queries and investigation such as 
determining proximity of assets to sensitive environmental areas which is a very long and time-












 SCADA Systems 
 
GRC uses several different SCADA systems including ClearSCADA and Citect with all systems 
progressively being upgraded to ClearSCADA. The SCADA systems are used by GRC to monitor assets 
for issues and failures and remotely operate assets where required. Access to SCADA data was unable 
to be obtained for the purposes of this dissertation due to accessibility and time constraints but is 




Figure 3-4: SCADA User Interface 
 
 
3.3 Asset Categorisation 
While assets are easily split into water and sewerage, there are many kinds of assets that require 
categorisation and grouping to effectively manage. For example, the management of electronic assets 
is very different to mechanical pump assets. GRC WBU categorises assets into class, sub-class, 
category, type and sub-type to assist with asset management activities. 
 
 Asset Classes 
 
GRC WBU have separated assets into two classes (as shown in Figure 3-5) due to the inherent 
differences between water and sewerage networks. Each asset class has been given a sub-class that 
reflects the general operation mode of the asset. Below ground assets such as sewerage gravity mains 
and manholes operate autonomously without any external inputs and are therefore considered 
“Passive” assets. Assets that require external inputs such as electricity or chemicals (typically above 














Level of Potential 
Compliance Exceedance 
The potential magnitude of compliance limit exceedance. 
Reporting Requirements 
The potential level of reporting required following an 
asset failure (e.g. CEO, State Government etc.) 
Environmental 
Damage 
Proximity to Sensitive 
Areas 
The relative proximity of an asset to environmentally 
sensitive areas and whether its failure will impact those 
areas. 
Level of Potential 
Contamination/Damage 
The magnitude of potential environmental 





The level and coverage of media attention regarding a 
failure event. 
Visibility to Public 
The level of physical visibility to the public during and 
following a failure event. 
Repair Costs 
Asset Cost 
The actual asset cost is a known quantity that is directly 
related to potential repair or replacement cost. 
Difficulty of Repair 
The difficulty of repair due to accessibility, complexity and 
available skills, spares, materials and equipment etc. 
measured in terms of time. 
Third Party Losses 
Type of Third-Party 
The type of third-party that will incur loss including 
general public, community, commercial, industrial and 
service authorities. 
Number of Impacted 
Parties 
Estimated number of third parties that will incur loss due 
to an asset failure. 




Estimated number of customers affected by an asset 
failure with respect to public health & safety. 
Level of Potential Impact 
The magnitude of potential public health & safety impacts 
in a worst-case event for that asset. 
 
 
3.6 Consequence of Failure Weightings 
 
 Calculation of Weightings using the AHP 
 
One of the key advantages of using the AHP is that many criteria can be considered as a series of one-
on-one comparisons between two criteria, greatly simplifying the assessment and ensuring the 
judgements are consistent by use of the Consistency Ratio (refer to Equation 4). The 6 consequence of 
failure categories and 17 sub-categories developed in section 3.5 were weighted using the AHP to be 
specific to GRC requirements. 
 
Initially a 16x16 (Sewerage) and 17x17 (Water) comparison matrix was developed to individually 
compare each sub-criteria, however with 256/289 comparisons this soon became overwhelming. The 
comparison was certainly time intensive, but mostly overwhelming due to the difficulty of choosing a 
meaningful score between 1 and 9 and maintaining consistency. There was also limited literature on 
Random Consistency Index values of n > 11 which were required to perform assessment at this scale. 
 
Instead, a two-level approach was taken with a 6x6 consequence of failure category matrix and various 
size matrices of sub-criteria limited to those under one of the main categories (i.e 4x4 under service 
delivery). The process for each matrix assessment was as follows: 
 
1. Develop 𝑥 × 𝑥 matrix scoring the top right diagonal half with reciprocal scoring automatically 






The global Priority Vector (VP) weighting for each sub-category was then determined by multiplying its 
PV by the PV of its main category as shown in Equation 5 and Figure 3-14. 
 
 
 Category𝑃𝑉 × Sub-Category𝑃𝑉 =  Global𝑃𝑉 (Equation 5) 
 
 










Equivalent Population (EP) Impacted 20.86 5.66 
Customer Type 4.81 1.31 
Level of Redundancy 24.16 6.56 
Failure Tolerance Period 50.17 13.62 
Figure 3-14: Example Global Sub-Category Weighting Calculation 
 
 
 Water Asset Global Weighting Results 
 
The results of the weighting for water assets is described in Figure 3-15. Operational had the highest 
overall category weighting with 27.14% which was closely followed by Governance on 21.53%, 
Financial on 21.42% and Safety on 15.26%. The Environmental category was approximately half of the 
higher categories at 9.77% while Reputation was considered unimportant with the lowest score of 
4.88%. The sub-categories were compared within each category and weightings determined. These 
weightings were then multiplied by the category weighting to determine the global sub-criteria 





Figure 3-15: Water Asset Consequence of Failure Criteria Weightings 
 
 
 Sewerage Asset Global Weighting Results 
 
The results of the weighting for sewerage assets is described in Figure 3-16. Operational had the 
highest overall category weighting with 29.52% which was closely followed by Financial on 22.35%. 
Environmental and Governance were equal on 15.05% closely followed by Safety on 13.44%. Again, 
Reputation was considered unimportant with the lowest score of 4.58%. The sub-categories were 
compared within each category and weightings determined. These weightings were then multiplied by 





Figure 3-16: Sewerage Asset Consequence of Failure Criteria Weightings 
 
 
3.7 Consequence Severity Evaluation Criteria 
 
Consequence severity evaluation criteria are an essential component of an ACA as they define the 
measurement scale and definition for each of the consequences of failure identified in section 3.5. The 
development of suitable consequence severity evaluation criteria involved: 
 
• Consideration of available data sources identified in section 3.2 with respect to how 
consequences could be measured and if a qualitative or quantitative assessment was 
applicable 
• Consideration of GRC risk management framework with respect to their enterprise 
consequence severity descriptions 
• Selection of a scoring scale to be used consistently across all consequence categories as a 
measure of the severity 




 GRC Risk Management Severity Alignment 
 
As part of the development of severity criteria, GRC’s Enterprise Risk Management Framework was 
reviewed with a particular focus on the consequence risk matrix used for the assessment of identified 
risks. The consequence matrix as shown in Table 3-9 utilised a semi-quantitative approach with both 
numerical and descriptive scoring being utilised and some consequences measured by cost or length 











PoF Score Calcs 
A probability of failure scoring page listing the condition 
score or estimated condition rating and aligned probability 
of failure percentage. 
Asset Data Input 
Input of source asset data including asset class, parent asset 
name and asset name that are referenced from other 
sheets. It includes a check to ensure all source data assets 
have had an Overall Asset Criticality Score produced. 
 
 
3.11 Chapter Summary 
 
Chapter 3 described the development of a robust supporting framework and methodology for GRC 
WBU to perform an asset criticality analysis on water and sewerage assets. 
 
• Available data sources were considered and used as much as practicable 
• Asset classification and failure mode identification using a high-level FMEA was used to inform 
consequence of failure criteria which were aligned with GRC’s risk management framework 
• Consequence of failure criteria were successfully weighted utilising the AHP 
• A consequence severity scoring scale was selected and definitions for each consequence of 
failure sub-category described 
• Probability of failure scoring was aligned with known and estimated asset condition scoring 
• The Overall Asset Criticality Score was defined utilising both the Overall Consequence of 
Failure Score and Probability of Failure Score. 
• A Microsoft Excel Asset Criticality Analysis Tool was developed and semi-automated to allow 


















With the ACA framework developed as discussed in Chapter 3 the Asset Criticality Analysis Tool was 
able to be applied to the study assets described in Chapter 4. The process used for active and passive 
assets has been briefly described in the following sections. 
 
To make data collection and scoring processes easier, a Scoring Assistance Tool was developed to 
complement the Asset Criticality Analysis Tool. The Scoring Assistance Tool is a spreadsheet that stores 
all the raw asset data required for the Asset Criticality Analysis Tool and provides a workspace for the 
calculation of consequence scores automatically via formulas or via manual entry. 
 
Due to time and resource constraints, asset data validation was not completed as part of the analysis. 
It is recommended that this is completed prior to utilising the results of the analysis to maximise the 
accuracy of the results. The definition of active and passive assets can be found in section 3.3.1. 
 
 
5.2 Application Process for Active Assets 
 
 Scoring Assistance Tool 
 
A Scoring Assistance Tool was developed as a working space to automatically calculate severity scores 
based on input data such as asset replacement cost, water/sewerage produced/treated and estimated 
population affected by failure. 
 
 
 Data Collection & Import for Active Assets 
 
Asset data was extracted from Assetic Cloud and the MapInfo GIS in multiple Microsoft Excel 
spreadsheets, one for each asset category. The selected study assets relevant attribute data was 
imported into the Scoring Assistance Tool under a separate sheet for each asset category. 
 
Relevant asset attribute data imported included: 
• Asset Number 
• Asset Category 
• Parent Asset Name 
• Asset Name 
• Replacement Cost 
• Condition Score 
• Construction Date 
• Useful Life (Years) 
• Estimated Water Produced/Sewerage Collected 
• Estimated EP Serviced 
• Estimated Revenue Generated (water assets only) 
 
No parent assets were considered in the data import as they would effectively duplicate child assets 





Figure 5-1: Screenshot of Scoring Assistance Tool Consequence Scoring Input Data for Active Assets 
 
 
 Consequence of Failure Scoring 
 
Due to the relatively small number of active assets selected for the study, each asset was individually 
assessed and scored across all consequence criteria as defined in section 3.7. These scores were 





Figure 5-2: Example Screenshot of Scoring Assistance Tool Consequence Scoring 
 
 
 Probability of Failure Scoring 
 
All active assets considered in the study had condition scoring data up to date as of 30/06/2018. These 
scores were entered into the Scoring Assistance Tool before being imported into the Asset Criticality 




Figure 5-3: Example Screenshot of Scoring Assistance Tool Probability of Failure Inputs 
 
 
5.3 Application Process for Passive Assets 
 







CIV.001468 Water Civil Rainbow Beach Bore TWS1 Bore Structure 14,020.12$        583 2423 1,218.89$    
CIV.001472 Water Civil Rainbow Beach Bore TWS1 Pipework 8,745.04$          583 2423 1,218.89$    
CSY.012043 Water Control Systems Rainbow Beach Bore TWS1 Telemetry 17,192.58$        0 0 -$              
ELE.001636 Water Electrical Rainbow Beach Bore TWS1 Switchboard 25,215.78$        583 2423 1,218.89$    
WPU.001704 Water Water Pump Rainbow Beach Bore TWS1 Pump Bore 20,135.16$        583 2423 1,218.89$    




































































CIV.001468 3 4 4 2 1 3 5 3 2 1 2 4 3 4 2 1 1
CIV.001472 3 4 2 2 1 2 4 2 3 3 1 1 3 4 2 1 4
CSY.012043 1 1 3 2 1 2 1 1 2 1 2 3 1 1 1 1 1
ELE.001636 3 4 4 2 1 2 1 1 2 1 2 3 3 4 2 1 5
WPU.001704 3 4 3 2 1 2 5 3 2 1 2 2 3 4 2 1 1
Reputation
Asset Number
Operational Governance Environmental Financial Safety
CIV.001468 3 30/06/2005 60
CIV.001472 3 30/06/2005 80
CSY.012043 3 30/06/2005 15
ELE.001636 3 30/06/2005 25
WPU.001704 3 30/06/2005 40
Asset Number Asset Construction DateAsset Condition Score Asset Useful Life (Years)
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Asset data was extracted from Assetic Cloud and the MapInfo GIS in multiple Microsoft Excel 
spreadsheets, one for each asset category. The selected study assets relevant attribute data was 
imported into the Scoring Assistance Tool under a separate sheet for each asset category. 
 
Relevant asset attribute data imported included: 
• Asset Number 
• Asset Category 
• Asset Name 
• Replacement Cost 
• Pipe Size 
• Pipe Length 
• Condition Score 
• Construction Date 
• Useful Life (Years) 
• Estimated Water Produced/Sewerage Collected 
• Estimated EP Serviced 




Figure 5-4: Example Screenshot of Scoring Assistance Tool Consequence Scoring Input Data for Passive Assets 
 
 
 Consequence of Failure Scoring 
 
Due to the large number of passive assets selected for the study, semi-automated formulas and 
assumptions were used to score the assets (as defined in section 3.7) wherever possible however some 
manual scoring was required due to the lack of usable asset spatial and modelling data as discussed in 
section 5.5. These scores were developed in the Scoring Assistance Tool before being imported into 
the Asset Criticality Analysis Tool in bulk. 
 
Refer to section 5.2.3 and Figure 5-2 for a visual representation. 
 
 Probability of Failure Scoring 
 
No passive assets considered in the study had condition scoring data within Assetic Cloud. Instead, 
condition scores were estimated based on the assets useful life and current asset age. The assets useful 
life and current asset age were entered into the Scoring Assistance Tool before being imported into 
the Asset Criticality Analysis Tool in bulk. 
 








WMA.008776 Water Pipe Water 100 AC: Nodes 21 - 19 15,416.00$        100 100 4.383 12 9.16$          
WMA.008777 Water Pipe Water 100 AC: Nodes 20 - 46 11,253.68$        100 73 3.199 9 6.69$          
WMA.008779 Water Pipe Water 100 AC: Nodes 15 - 16 27,748.80$        100 180 7.889 21 16.49$       
WMA.008781 Water Pipe Water 100 AC: Nodes 42 - 37 19,115.84$        100 124 5.435 15 11.36$       
WMA.008782 Water Pipe Water 100 AC: Nodes 39 - 38 4,470.64$          100 29 1.271 3 2.66$          























5.4 Criticality Analysis Scoring 
 
The Consequence of Failure and Probability of Failure scoring data was imported into the Asset 
Criticality Analysis Tool from the Scoring Assistance Tool which automatically calculated the overall 
Consequence of Failure score (section 3.7), Probability of Failure score (section 3.8) and Overall Asset 
Criticality scores using the formula defined in section 3.9. A screenshot of the results page is shown in 
Figure 5-5 and higher resolution screenshots of the entire Asset Criticality Analysis tool have been 




Figure 5-5: Asset Criticality Analysis Tool – Overall Criticality Score Sheet 
 
 
5.5 Asset Data Gap Analysis 
 
After applying the scoring process, it was clear that there were some gaps in asset data that once filled 
would be highly beneficial to improving to automation and accuracy of scoring. These data gaps did 
not prevent scoring of any assets but required more manual scoring and consideration that may not 
be feasible for significant numbers of assets. 
 
 
 GIS Spatial to Asset Data Link 
 
There is a linking data field in place between the GIS and AMS however over time the accuracy and 
updating of the field has not been effectively maintained to the point that spatial queries using QGIS 
were not able to be utilised to help with scoring as the GIS reference could not be matched to a 
corresponding Asset ID. This highlights the importance of a 1-to-1 relationship between the systems 
and should be a priority for GRC WBU to rectify. 
 
 
 Modelling Software 
 
GRC WBU recently obtained modelling software and have begun preliminary modelling and 
verification of the water and sewerage networks. Access to this data and software was unable to be 
arranged but would have greatly increased the automation and accuracy of items like Equivalent 




 Asset Data Accuracy 
 
Generally, the asset data for active assets is very high level compared to other water authorities with 
major treatment processes or asset groups summarised as one item rather than breaking down into 
individual assets. This has the affect that all assets within the treatment process are given the same 
condition rating and cannot be prioritised effectively. There is also bare minimum asset data in that 
common information like pumping capacities and switchboard input powers etc. have not been 
collected. 
 
With respect to passive assets, the asset data is generally sufficient and in line with other water 
authorities however there is some question of the currency of the data and suitable linkage to the GIS 
system. The key aspect of missing data is relevant condition scoring for the majority of assets which 
meant that all passive assets utilised estimated condition scoring in the ACA tool. 
 
 
5.6 Chapter Summary 
 
Chapter 5 discussed the process used to apply the framework developed in Chapter 3 to the study 
assets described in Chapter 4 and provided visual examples to aid in understanding. The key process 
elements included: 
 
• Data Collection & Import into the Scoring Assistance Tool 
• Consequence of Failure Scoring in the Scoring Assistance Tool as per section 3.5 
• Probability of Failure Scoring in the Scoring Assistance Tool as per section 3.8 
• Overall Asset Criticality Scoring in the Asset Criticality Analysis Tool as per section 3.9 
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The Asset Criticality Analysis was completed using the developed tool and process described in Chapter 
5. This chapter analyses the results and provides commentary on the results with respect to validity 
and original expectations. 
 
The results include a graphical representation of all assets for parent assets with 10 or less child assets, 
and the top 10 critical assets for all other asset categories. The graphs show the static Overall 
Consequence Score and dynamic Overall Asset Criticality Score to help give an appreciation of the 
influence the Probability of Failure has on the level of asset criticality and risk. 
 
 
6.2 Water Asset Criticality Scoring 
 
The Asset Criticality Analysis was performed on 2681 water assets across each of the eight asset 
categories with the full detailed results provided in Appendix C. 
 
 
 Rainbow Beach Bore TW1 
 
The results of the Asset Criticality Analysis for the Rainbow Beach Bore TW1 are presented in Figure 








In terms of consequence of failure only, the bore structure is the most critical asset with a consequence 
score of 46.93, closely followed by the bore’s switchboard on 46.75. This appears to be appropriate as 
no water can be produced if the bore structure fails, it is difficult, lengthy and costly to repair and has 
the potential to directly contaminate the aquifer. Similarly, no water can be sourced if the switchboard 
fails which can be expensive to repair or replace. The switchboard has a relatively high safety rating 
due to the potential for electrocution and arc flash resulting in death. Pipework is the next most critical 
asset with a score of 41.81 for similar reasons to the bore structure and switchboard, however due to 
its relatively low cost and ease of repair its consequence of failure is somewhat lessened. It has the 
highest reputation score due to its visibility to the public (i.e leaking water). Just below pipework is the 
bore pump with a score of 40.90. Its relatively low safety score is due to the fact that it is located at 
the bottom of the bore with little potential to cause impact. Conversely, it had the equal highest 
potential to cause environmental impacts due to its location. Like pipework, bore pumps are relatively 
easy to repair or replace. The least critical asset was the telemetry system with a score of 32.67 as it 
was not critical for the bore to produce water (its primary function) but was important for compliance 





Figure 6-2: Rainbow Beach Bore TW1 – Overall Asset Criticality Scores 
 
 
When considering the consequence of failure with the probability of failure, the pattern is repeated 
with a probability of failure of 50% being applied to all five assets. With overall consequence of failure 
scores of 32.67—46.93 out of 100 and asset criticality scores ranging between 16.33-23.47 out of 100 
it can be reasoned that while the bore is moderate to low critical, and it is in fair condition. Overall the 




 Kinbombi Creek Weir 
 
The results of the Asset Criticality Analysis for the Kinbombi Creek Weir are presented in Figure 6-3 




Figure 6-3: Kinbombi Creek Weir – Overall Consequence of Failure Scores 
 
 
In terms of consequence of failure only, the spillway/embankment is the most critical asset with a 
consequence score of 47.20, followed by the water inlet tower on 43.81. This appears to be 
appropriate as no water can be impounded and collected if the spillway/embankment fails, it is 
difficult, lengthy and costly to repair and has the potential to contaminate downstream of Kinbombi 
Creek. Similarly, no water can be sourced if the inlet tower fails which would be difficult to repair or 
replace within the dam structure. The least critical asset was the inlet tower walkway with a score of 
31.29 as it was not critical for weir to collect or distribute water (its primary function) but was 






Figure 6-4: Kinbombi Creek Weir – Overall Asset Criticality Scores 
 
 
When considering the consequence of failure with the probability of failure, the scoring is much closer 
across the three assets due to a difference in condition ratings. The notable difference is the walkway 
with a probability of failure of 75% which has increased the criticality of the walkway to just below the 
spillway/embankment and above the inlet tower. At first glance the walkway score doesn’t align with 
expectations as it is a non-critical component of the weir in terms of function (i.e. not required to 
produce water). However, when considering that the other components are in relatively fair condition 
and are less likely to fail, the walkway becomes the highest risk and therefore priority between the 
three assets. If repairs or maintenance were carried out on the walkway improving its condition to 50% 
probability of failure, it would have an asset criticality score of 15.65 which would align with original 
expectations of being less critical than the spillway/embankment and inlet tower. 
 
With overall consequence of failure scores of 31.29—47.20 out of 100 and asset criticality scores 
ranging between 21.91-23.60 out of 100 it can be reasoned that while the weir is moderately critical it 
is not highly critical, and its key components are in fair condition. This aligns with the fact that the weir 
is not the only water source for Goomeri and its failure can be tolerated. Overall the asset criticality 
scores aligned with expectations and appeared reasonable. 
 
 
 Jones Hill Water Treatment Plant 
 
The results of the Asset Criticality Analysis for the Jones Hill Water Treatment Plant are presented in 





Figure 6-5: Jones Hill Water Treatment Plant – Overall Consequence of Failure Scores 
 
 
Out of the 82 assets at the WTP, the top 10 assets in terms of overall asset criticality score were 
considered. In terms of consequence of failure only, the backwash tank is the most critical asset with 
a consequence score of 83.49, closely followed by the raw water pump well (81.83), clarification tank 
(81.42), filtration system (81.36), filtration media (81.36), fluoride dosing system (80.96), filtration 
tanks (80.44), and chemical storage silos (79.86). The lowest scoring asset was the scraper 
drive/system within the clarification tank with a score of 70.69 which is noticeably lower than the other 
top 10 assets. As expected with a water treatment plant, there are multiple expensive assets that are 
essential to producing water and without them production will cease.  
 
The backwash tank is a large and expensive asset that is used to store dirty filtrate water for recovery 
and therefore has the potential to contaminate the environment and stop water production. It also 
has a significant safety risk from the potential for falling into the tank and/or drowning. Similarly, the 
clarification tank, filtration tank, filtration systems and filtration media are large and complex assets 
to repair or reconstruct. If any of these assets fail water production will cease. The fluoride dosing 
system ranks highly due to its potential for environmental contamination and for risks to health and 
safety due to overdosing. The chemical storage silos rank highly for the similar reasons. The clarifier 
scraper drive/system ranks slightly lower due to the fact that its failure can be tolerated for a short 
period of time, is less costly and has very little environmental contamination potential located at the 
bottom of the clarifier tank. It does however rank highly in difficulty of repair due to its location. Overall 





Figure 6-6: Jones Hill Water Treatment Plant – Overall Asset Criticality Scores 
 
 
When considering the consequence of failure with the probability of failure, the criticality scoring is 
the same pattern across the assets due to the same probability of failure with the exception of the 
clarification scraper drive/system which has a probability of failure of 75% due to its condition. This 
scenario is a great example of when an asset with lower consequence is actually more critical than 
others due to the increased probability of the consequences occurring. The scoring has identified that 
the scraper drive requires maintenance/repair or replacement to reduce its probability of failure and 
has prioritised the asset at the top of the scoring until this occurs. Once the condition is improved the 
scraper drive will drop out of the top 10 and a new priority asset will become the part of the 
organisations focus. 
 
With overall consequence of failure scores of 70.6—83.49 out of 100 and asset criticality scores ranging 
between 39.93-53.02 out of 100 it is clear that the water treatment plant assets are extremely critical, 
with most assets in fair condition. This aligns with the fact that the water treatment plant is the only 
supply for the city of Gympie and surrounding suburbs. Overall the asset criticality scores aligned with 




 Gympie Wineglass High-Level Reservoir 
 
The results of the Asset Criticality Analysis for the Gympie Wineglass High-Level Reservoir are 




Figure 6-7: Gympie Wineglass High-Level Reservoir – Overall Consequence of Failure Scores 
 
 
In terms of consequence of failure only, the reservoir structure is the most critical asset with a 
consequence score of 74.92. This appears to be appropriate as water pressure will be significantly 
reduced for a large number of customers if the reservoir structure fails and it is very complex, lengthy 
and costly to repair/replace. Interestingly the reservoir structure has a high reputation score due to its 
visibility of its failure to the public. Pipework is the next most critical asset with a score of 46.96 for 
similar reasons to the reservoir structure, however due to its relatively low cost and ease of repair its 
consequence of failure is somewhat lessened. Just below pipework is the reservoir valves with a score 
of 42.74. The reservoir valves scored equal with pipework other than their cost of repair/replacement 
which was relatively lower. The least critical asset was the telemetry system with a score of 36.33 as it 
was not critical for the reservoir to maintain water pressure (its primary function) but was important 
for compliance and efficient operations. Overall the consequence scoring aligned with expectations 





Figure 6-8: Gympie Wineglass High-Level Reservoir – Overall Asset Criticality Scores 
 
 
When considering the consequence of failure with the probability of failure, the pattern is repeated 
with a probability of failure of 50% being applied to all four assets. With overall consequence of failure 
scores of 36.33—74.92 out of 100 and asset criticality scores ranging between 18.16-37.46 out of 100 
it can be reasoned that reservoir structure is highly critical, the other assets are of moderate to low 
criticality and all assets are in fair condition. Overall the asset criticality scores aligned with 
expectations and appear reasonable. 
 
 
 Rainbow Beach Water Booster Pump Station 
 
The results of the Asset Criticality Analysis for the Rainbow Beach Water Booster Pump Station are 





Figure 6-9: Rainbow Beach Water Booster Pump Station – Overall Consequence of Failure Scores 
 
 
In terms of consequence of failure only, the pump station pipework is the most critical asset with a 
consequence score of 43.58, closely followed by the switchboard on 52.99. This appears to be 
appropriate as the treated water supply can’t reach the distribution reservoir without the pipework, 
has the potential to contaminate the environment and its failure is visible to the public. Interestingly 
the pump station pipework scored higher than pipework for similar assets such as the bore and 
wineglass reservoir. Similar to pipework, no water can be pumped if the switchboard fails which can 
be expensive to repair or replace. The switchboard has a relatively high safety rating due to the 
potential for electrocution and arc flash resulting in death. The pump station is the next most critical 
asset with a score of 51.47 for similar reasons to the pipework and switchboard. Scoring lower than 
the pump station is the two booster pumps with an equal score of 43.08. Due to the duty/standby 
arrangement of the pumps there was a level of redundancy available which reduced potential 
operation consequences. Pumps are also relatively easy to source replacements for and maintain. The 
least critical assets were the pump station shed enclosure on 40.75 and the telemetry system with a 
score of 38.38. Both the shed and telemetry are not critical for the pump station to supply water (its 
primary function) but are important for avoiding asset exposure to harsh conditions, compliance and 






Figure 6-10: Rainbow Beach Water Booster Pump Station – Overall Asset Criticality Scores 
 
 
When considering the consequence of failure with the probability of failure, the criticality scoring is 
the same pattern across the assets due to the same probability of failure with the exception of the 
pipework which has a lower probability of failure of 25% due to its good condition. This scenario is a 
great example of when an asset with greater consequence is less critical than others due to the 
reduced probability of the consequences occurring. If the condition of the pipework was to deteriorate 
increasing the probability of failure to 50%, it would be reprioritised as the most critical asset with a 
score of 26.78 and become part of the organisations focus. 
 
With overall consequence of failure scores of 38.38—53.58 out of 100 and asset criticality scores 
ranging between 13.39-26.50 out of 100 the pump station assets can be considered moderately 
critical, with most assets in fair condition. Given that the pump station is required for water to be 
distributed to Rainbow Beach it appears that the criticality scoring is a bit low when compared to 
expectations. This is potentially due to the small number of EP serviced in Rainbow Beach where the 
highest score the scheme can achieve is a 3 out of 5 for EP effected and suggests that some additional 
refinement to the definitions may be required. 
 
 
 Rainbow Beach Water Mains 
 
The results of the Asset Criticality Analysis for the Rainbow Beach Water Mains are presented in Figure 





Figure 6-11: Rainbow Beach Water Mains – Overall Consequence of Failure Scores 
 
 
Out of the 219 water pipe assets studied, the top 10 assets in terms of overall asset criticality score 
were considered. In terms of consequence of failure only, segments of pipe closest to the treatment 
plant were the most critical as their failure would prevent water distribution. Other than some minor 
differences in cost the consequence of failure scores were relatively close between 38.88-41.47 with 
the link from the treatment plant to node 1 the most critical and costly. Overall the results are generally 
too close for meaningful prioritisation and suggests that some additional refinement to the definitions 
may be required. Integration of water modelling data and a revision of the definitions may greatly 





Figure 6-12: Rainbow Beach Water Mains – Overall Asset Criticality Scores 
 
 
When considering the consequence of failure with the probability of failure, the pattern is repeated 
with a probability of failure of 75% being applied to all ten assets. The high probability of failure aligns 
with the aged asbestos cement (AC) pipes which highlights why newer and larger DN300 PVC pipes 
don’t make the top 10. With overall consequence of failure scores of 38.88-48.56 out of 100 and asset 
criticality scores ranging between 29.16-36.42 out of 100 the top 10 pipe segments can be considered 
to be moderately critical, due to their poor condition. As discussed above, overall the results are 
generally too close for meaningful prioritisation and require amendments to the framework. 
 
 
 Rainbow Beach Water Nodes 
 
The results of the Asset Criticality Analysis for the Rainbow Beach Water Nodes are presented in Figure 





Figure 6-13: Rainbow Beach Water Nodes – Overall Consequence of Failure Scores 
 
 
Out of the 339 water node assets studied, the top 10 assets in terms of overall asset criticality score 
were considered. In terms of consequence of failure only, the top 10 critical assets were large sluice 
valves and several air and scour valves. This is likely due to the higher costs when compared to some 
of the other water node asset types like hydrants and smaller sluice valves. Other than some minor 
differences in cost the consequence of failure scores were relatively close between 27.48-3.11 with 
the two large sluice valves the most critical and costly at 36.51. Overall the results are generally too 
close for meaningful prioritisation and suggests that some additional refinement to the definitions may 
be required. For example, failure of a valve may mean a section of network can’t be isolated for a 
shutdown/repair, but water supply is still maintained which aligns with a low operational score. 
Integration of water modelling data and a revision of the definitions with this in mind may greatly 
improve the accuracy and validity of the data. 
 
Interestingly hydrants generally scored very low in terms of criticality due to the fact that their failure 
is only an impact when fighting a fire and does not affect water supply. Providing enough fire hydrants 
and with sufficient flow is a regulatory requirement however it is difficult to incorporate this 





Figure 6-14: Rainbow Beach Water Nodes – Overall Asset Criticality Scores 
 
 
When considering the consequence of failure with the probability of failure, the pattern is repeated 
with a probability of failure of 75% being applied to all ten assets. The high probability of failure aligns 
with the age of the valves which highlights why newer and larger DN300 valves don’t make the top 10. 
With overall consequence of failure scores of 27.48-36.51 out of 100 and asset criticality scores ranging 
between 20.61-27.38 out of 100 the top 10 pipe segments can be considered to be moderately critical, 
due to their poor condition. As discussed above, overall the results are generally too close for 




 Rainbow Beach Water Services & Meters 
 
The results of the Asset Criticality Analysis for the Rainbow Beach Water Services & Meters are 





Figure 6-15: Rainbow Beach Water Services & Meters – Overall Consequence of Failure Scores 
 
 
Out of the 2022 water service and water meter assets studied, the top 10 assets in terms of overall 
asset criticality score were considered. In terms of consequence of failure only, the top 10 critical assets 
were a 50/50 split of water services and water meters with sizes ranging between 20-100mm. The 
larger 100mm services had higher costs and more important customer types which gave them the 
highest consequence of failure score of 34.31. The 100mm water meter was slightly lower on 32.20 
while the rest of the 20-32mm services were equal on 28.40.  It was expected that the 32mm meters 
would be more critical than 20mm meters however it appears cost has been allocated equally in the 
asset data. Overall the results are generally too close for meaningful prioritisation and suggests that 





Figure 6-16: Rainbow Beach Water Services & Meters – Overall Asset Criticality Scores 
 
 
When considering the consequence of failure with the probability of failure, there is a lot of variation 
with four assets having 100% probability of failure, three assets having 75% probability and three 
having 50% probability. The 100% probability of failure is based on an estimated condition score which 
means that the assets age is past its expected useful life. This suggests that the asset should be 
physically assessed to determine its actual condition and re-assessed for criticality. With overall 
consequence of failure scores of 28.40-34.31 out of 100 and asset criticality scores ranging between 
16.10-28.40 out of 100 the top 10 water services and meters can be considered to be of low criticality, 
due to their impact on only one property/business. As discussed above, overall the results are generally 
too close for meaningful prioritisation and suggests that some additional refinement to the definitions 
may be required. 
 
 
6.3 Sewerage Criticality Scoring 
 
The Asset Criticality Analysis was performed on 2045 sewerage assets across each of the five asset 
categories with the full detailed results provided in Appendix C. 
 
 
 Gympie Sewerage Treatment Plant 
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The results of the Asset Criticality Analysis for the Gympie Sewerage Treatment Plant are presented in 




Figure 6-17: Gympie Sewerage Treatment Plant – Overall Consequence of Failure Scores 
 
 
Out of the 144 assets at the STP, the top 10 assets in terms of overall asset criticality score were 
considered. In terms of consequence of failure only, the bioreactor tank, clarification tanks and aerobic 
digester tank are the most critical assets with an equal consequence score of 90.18. These assets are 
closely followed by the three chlorine contact tanks (88.81), site pipework (86.51) and chlorine 
disinfection systems (82.41). As expected with a sewerage treatment plant, there are multiple 
expensive assets that are essential to treating sewerage and without them treatment will cease and 
may result in compliance breeches and environmental contamination. 
 
The bioreactor tank, clarification tank and aerobic digester tanks are large and expensive assets that 
are used to hold sewerage in different stages of treatment, has the potential to contaminate the 
environment and are essential for the treatment process. They also have a significant safety risk from 
the potential for falling into one of the tanks and/or drowning. Similarly the chlorine contact tanks and 
disinfection systems are essential for disinfection of the sewerage to meet regulatory compliance 
requirements for release. Without these systems environmental damage may occur from effluent 
released. Site pipework is required to transfer sewerage between treatment processes and any failure 
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will potentially result in environmental contamination and cease treatment processes. Overall the 




Figure 6-18: Gympie Sewerage Treatment Plant – Overall Asset Criticality Scores 
 
 
When considering the consequence of failure with the probability of failure, the pattern is repeated 
with a probability of failure of 50% being applied to all ten assets. This is consistent with the treatment 
plant being upgraded in 2009 and the assets all similar age. With overall consequence of failure scores 
of 82.41-90.1 out of 100 and asset criticality scores ranging between 42.21-45.09 out of 100 it is clear 
that the sewerage treatment plant assets are extremely critical, with most assets in fair condition. This 
aligns with the fact that the sewerage treatment plant is the only sewerage treatment facility for the 
city of Gympie and surrounding suburbs. Overall the asset criticality scores aligned with expectations 
and appeared reasonable. 
 
 
 Gympie Sewerage Pump Station G1 
 
The results of the Asset Criticality Analysis for the Gympie Sewerage Pump Station G1 are presented 





Figure 6-19: Gympie Sewerage Pump Station G1 – Overall Consequence of Failure Scores 
 
 
In terms of consequence of failure only, the pump station well structure and above ground valve pit 
are the most critical assets with a consequence score of 89.88, closely followed by the switchboard 
(83.48), pipework (83.14), mechanical equipment (79.23) and sewerage pumps (76.74). The lowest 
scoring assets were the ventilation (38.45), instrumentation (37.52) and telemetry systems (37.52) 
which were noticeably lower than the other top 10 assets. As expected with a major sewerage pump 
station, there are several expensive assets that are essential to transferring raw sewerage without 
environmental contamination.  
 
The pump station well structure extends several meters below ground making it difficult to repair or 
replace and costly to do so. Failure of the well will result in environmental contamination and prevent 
the sewerage from being transferred to the treatment plant. The valve pit structure extends above 
ground over the wet well and its failure has equivalent consequences to the well structure. Similarly, 
sewerage can’t be transferred if the switchboard fails which can be expensive to repair or replace. The 
switchboard has a relatively high safety rating due to the potential for electrocution and arc flash 
resulting in death. Pipework is the next most critical asset, however due to its relatively low cost and 
ease of repair its consequence of failure is somewhat lessened. The mechanical equipment and pumps 
are comparable with pipework in that they are required to transfer sewerage but have a level of 
redundancy (duty/standby pumps) and are relatively easy to source replacements for. All of these 
assets have a relatively high reputation score due to its visibility to the public and upsetting nature (i.e 
leaking raw sewerage). The ventilation system is required to allow personnel to enter the confined 
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space valve pit and does not contribute to the primary function of the pump station. The 
instrumentation and telemetry systems are also non-critical with respect to the primary function 
however are important for maintaining regulatory compliance and for efficient operations. Overall the 




Figure 6-20: Gympie Sewerage Pump Station G1 – Overall Asset Criticality Scores 
 
 
When considering the consequence of failure with the probability of failure, the pattern is repeated 
with a probability of failure of 50% being applied to all ten assets. This aligns with the aging pump 
station having been upgraded in recent years to maintain a fair condition. With overall consequence 
of failure scores of 37.52-89.88 out of 100 and asset criticality scores ranging between 18.76-44.94 out 
of 100 most of the pump station assets are highly critical, with a few low criticality assets. Overall the 
asset criticality scores aligned with expectations and appeared reasonable. 
 
 
 Rainbow Beach Sewerage Mains 
 
The results of the Asset Criticality Analysis for the Rainbow Beach Sewerage Mains are presented in 





Figure 6-21: Rainbow Beach Sewerage Mains – Overall Consequence of Failure Scores 
 
 
Out of the 453 sewerage pipe assets studied, the top 10 assets in terms of overall asset criticality score 
were considered. In terms of consequence of failure only, rising mains and segments of larger trunk 
main closest to the treatment plant were the most critical as their failure would prevent sewerage 
transfer. The rising mains and DN 225 trunk mains scored closely between 68.07-70.56 while the 
smaller DN150 trunk mains were equal on the lower score of 63.40. Overall the results are generally 
too close for meaningful prioritisation and suggests that some additional refinement to the definitions 
may be required. Integration of sewerage modelling data and a revision of the definitions may greatly 






Figure 6-22: Rainbow Beach Sewerage Mains – Overall Asset Criticality Scores 
 
 
When considering the consequence of failure with the probability of failure, the pattern is repeated 
with a probability of failure of 50% being applied to all ten assets. With overall consequence of failure 
scores of 63.40-70.75 out of 100 and asset criticality scores ranging between 31.70-35.38 out of 100 
the top 10 pipe segments can be considered to be moderately to highly critical, due to their fair 
condition. As discussed above, overall the results are generally too close for meaningful prioritisation 
and require amendments to the framework. 
 
 
 Rainbow Beach Sewerage Nodes 
 
The results of the Asset Criticality Analysis for the Rainbow Beach Sewerage Nodes are presented in 





Figure 6-23: Rainbow Beach Sewerage Nodes – Overall Consequence of Failure Scores 
 
 
Out of the 427 sewerage node assets studied, the top 10 assets in terms of overall asset criticality score 
were considered. In terms of consequence of failure only, the top 10 critical assets were all manholes 
located on trunk main lines with the same consequence score of 57.65. Overall the results are generally 
too close for meaningful prioritisation and suggests that some additional refinement to the definitions 
may be required. Integration of sewerage modelling data and a revision of the definitions may greatly 





Figure 6-24: Rainbow Beach Sewerage Nodes – Overall Asset Criticality Scores 
 
 
When considering the consequence of failure with the probability of failure, the pattern is repeated 
with a probability of failure of 50% being applied to all ten assets. With an overall consequence of 
failure score of 57.65 out of 100 and asset criticality score of 28.83 out of 100 the top 10 sewerage 
nodes can be considered to be moderately critical, due to their fair condition. As discussed above, 
overall the results are generally too close for meaningful prioritisation and suggests that some 
additional refinement to the definitions may be required. 
 
 
 Rainbow Beach Sewerage Services 
 
The results of the Asset Criticality Analysis for the Rainbow Beach Sewerage Services are presented in 





Figure 6-25: Rainbow Beach Sewerage Services – Overall Consequence of Failure Scores 
 
 
Out of the 1011 sewerage service assets studied, the top 10 assets in terms of overall asset criticality 
score were considered. In terms of consequence of failure only, the top 10 critical assets were all 
standard 100mm house connection branches with scores between 41.3-42.49 depending on the 
customer serviced. Overall the results are generally too close for meaningful prioritisation and suggests 





Figure 6-26: Rainbow Beach Sewerage Services – Overall Asset Criticality Scores 
 
 
When considering the consequence of failure with the probability of failure, there is a lot of variation 
with two assets having 50% probability of failure, three assets having 25% probability and three having 
10% probability. The 10% probability of failure appears to be an asset data anomaly. This suggests that 
the assets should be physically assessed to determine their actual condition and re-assessed for 
criticality. With overall consequence of failure scores of 41.93-42.49 out of 100 and asset criticality 
scores ranging between 4.22-21.25 out of 100 the top 10 sewerage services can be considered to be 
of low criticality, due to their impact on only one property/business. As discussed above, overall the 
results are generally too close for meaningful prioritisation and suggests that some additional 
refinement to the definitions may be required. 
 
 
6.4 Average Overall Criticality Scoring Summary 
 
In addition to the detailed assessment of the top ten assets, the Average Overall Criticality Score was 
determined for each of the asset categories as detailed in Table 6-1 to provide an indication of where 




prioritisation. However, many lower criticality assets that were very similar had equal scores which 
meant they could not be individually prioritised. This indicated that amendments to the framework 




Figure 6-27: All Water & Sewerage Assets Combined Results – Overall Consequence of Failure Scores 
 
 
The combined water and sewerage top 10 assets in terms of overall asset criticality were dominated 
by active sewerage assets with seven from the sewerage treatment plant and two from the sewerage 
pump station. The scoring ranged between 88.81-90.18 in terms of consequence of failure only while 
the water treatment plant scraper scored much lower of 70.69. It is noted that the scoring of several 
items is equivalent which means that unique prioritisation isn’t achievable. It is envisioned that as the 
high-level assets are broken down into smaller components and asset condition assessment revised 





Figure 6-28: All Water & Sewerage Assets Combined Results – Overall Asset Criticality Scores 
 
 
When considering the consequence of failure with the probability of failure, the pattern is repeated 
with a probability of failure of 50% being applied to all assets but one with 75%. The poor condition of 
the water treatment plant clarifier scraper has made it the most critical GRC WBU asset even though 
its overall consequence of failure score is much lower than some of the others. However, it is noted 
that if the asset condition is improved to obtain a probability of failure of 50% its overall asset criticality 
would reduce to 35.35 which would drop it out of the top 10. These results highlight the benefit of 
using a risk based and dynamic ACA framework. As discussed above, overall the results are generally 
too close for unique prioritisation but as the high-level assets are broken down into smaller 
components and asset condition assessment revised that this will improve the granularity. 
 
 
6.6 Asset Management Program Recommendations 
 
 Asset Data Collection 
 
Asset data collection activities should be carried out on all asset categories in the following order of 
priority (based on the average overall criticality scoring): 
 
1. Sewerage Pump Station 
2. Sewerage Treatment Plant 
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3. Water Treatment Plants 
4. Water Reservoir 
5. Water Booster Pump Station 
6. Raw Water Bore 
7. Sewerage Mains 
8. Water Mains 
9. Water Nodes – Valve 
10. Sewerage Nodes 
11. Water Nodes – Hydrants 
12. Sewerage Services 
13. Water Services & Meters 
 
These activities should include: 
• Verification of existing asset data 
• Break-down of assets into isolated systems or parts 
• Collection of new data relevant to the asset that can be used to assess its capacity etc. 
• Verification of existing or collection new of asset condition data 
• Verification of severity scoring and update of ACA results 
 
 
 Asset Condition Assessment Recommendations 
 
Asset condition assessment activities should be carried out on all asset categories in the following 
order of priority (based on the average overall criticality scoring): 
 
1. Sewerage Pump Station 
2. Sewerage Treatment Plant 
3. Water Treatment Plants 
4. Water Reservoir 
5. Water Booster Pump Station 
6. Raw Water Bore 
7. Sewerage Mains 
8. Water Mains 
9. Water Nodes – Valve 
10. Sewerage Nodes 
11. Water Nodes – Hydrants 
12. Sewerage Services 
13. Water Services & Meters 
 
Individual asset assessment should be prioritised according to the asset’s overall asset criticality score 
from highest to lowest. This will allow verification the probability of failure and severity and downgrade 
the criticality of assets prior to performing any maintenance or capital works activities 
 
 
 Maintenance Program Recommendations 
 
Asset maintenance activities should be carried out on all asset categories in the following order of 
priority (based on the average overall criticality scoring): 
 
1. Sewerage Pump Station 
2. Sewerage Treatment Plant 
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3. Water Treatment Plants 
4. Water Reservoir 
5. Water Booster Pump Station 
6. Raw Water Bore 
7. Sewerage Mains 
8. Water Mains 
9. Water Nodes – Valve 
10. Sewerage Nodes 
11. Water Nodes – Hydrants 
12. Sewerage Services 
13. Water Services & Meters 
 
Individual asset maintenance should be prioritised according to the asset’s probability of failure score 
from highest to lowest followed over overall asset criticality score. The assets condition should be 
verified before performing any maintenance and should be of “Moderate Criticality” or higher. 
 
 
6.7 Chapter Summary 
 
Chapter 6 discussed the results of the ACA in detail looking at the top 10 assets for each asset category 
across both asset classes. It was demonstrated through the graph and table results that the framework 
functioned but with varying degrees of success in terms of true prioritisation with recommendations 
for framework amendments to be made. Based on the results of the ACA, recommendations were able 








The aim of this work was to develop an asset prioritisation tool with a documented framework for GRC 
WBU to assist with making informed decisions regarding the management of their assets. This chapter 
summarises and discusses the overall outcomes of the dissertation with respect to the following 
aspects: 
 
• Research Limitations 
• Overall conclusions and framework improvement recommendations 





Several limitations were encountered and noted during the development of this dissertation. The 
framework and ACA tool should be treated as preliminary and should be customised and verified with 
a continuous improvement development program. 
 
The key limitation of the results is that the analysis has only been applied to a sub-set of the total asset 
data base of over 30,000+ assets. This may have skewed the results towards those that were included 
in the study and inclusion of additional assets may change the top priorities and average scoring for 
each asset category. This may change the recommendations for asset data collection, condition 
assessment and maintenance activities. Once the full asset database has been applied, the results 
should be reviewed to verify that the results and recommendations still align. 
 
Similarly, the results are heavily dependent on the quality and accuracy of asset data provided from 
the AMS and GIS systems. It was noted in the study that there are some data gaps, questionable 
currency of data and disconnects between the AMS and GIS. As there was no feasible way to verify all 
asset data as part of this work it is essential that asset data, severity scoring, and condition is verified 
before performing any recommended asset management activities. 
 
While one of the key objectives of the framework was to be based on semi-quantitative data and 
working towards quantitative, the available data instead required a greater reliance on qualitative data 
and assessment which increases the potential of unconscious bias within the framework and therefore 
the results. It is recommended that as asset management practices improve over time, the framework 
is amended to utilise historic data sources such as a such SCADA logging and modelling software 
results. 
 
Finally, there was limited detailed literature for risk-based asset criticality analysis of water and 
sewerage assets, particularly with any reference or relevance to Australian local government. The 
majority of literature identified did not include a probability of failure (i.e. risk) aspect and therefore 





There were three key objectives of the dissertation that were identified in the project specification 
detailed in Appendix A and discussed in Chapter 1. The first was the development of a documented 
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ACA framework informed by existing literature and customised to suit the GRC WBU. Assets were 
categorised and a high-level failure modes and effects analysis (FMEA) applied to each category to 
determine failure modes. The identified failure modes were used to inform the development of 
Consequence of Failure criteria. These criteria were aligned with the GRC risk management framework 
and weighted in terms of relative importance using the AHP process developed by Thomas Saaty. A 
consequence severity scoring scale and definitions were developed to numerically quantify 
consequences and support consistent assessment of asset failure consequences. This allowed 
determination of a static Overall Consequence of Failure Score. A Probability of Failure scoring scale 
was developed by aligning a mixture of condition assessment scoring data and estimated asset 
condition based on age with probability of failure. The Consequence of Failure and Probability of 
Failure scores were combined to derive the dynamic Overall Asset Criticality Score that allowed 
prioritisation of assets. The documentation of these key aspects throughout Chapter 3 could quickly 
be adapted to formalise the framework in a standard GRC WBU document format if required. 
 
While the framework and its application were considered successful, it was not without faults. The 
severity definitions were mostly qualitatively based rather than quantitative or semi-quantitative, 
introducing the potential for unconscious bias and reducing automated severity scoring potential. 
While the framework appeared to work appropriately for active assets, passive asset scoring was not 
always granular enough to uniquely prioritise assets. General observations to correct this suggest that 
utilising decimal scoring rather than just integers may improve the granularity of results. Similarly, a 
transition to automated quantitative based scoring and utilising additional data sources such as 
modelling software may improve the results. 
 
The second key objective was to develop a Microsoft Excel based spreadsheet ACA tool that allowed 
for the import of data and semi-automated calculation of ACA results based on the developed 
framework. While not originally planned, a second spreadsheet tool was developed as a working space 
for raw asset data and scoring calculations before transfer into the main ACA tool. The ACA tool 
included the weighted criteria scoring and AHP based matrices in a form that allows for dynamic 
updates to the weightings by modifying the pairwise comparison matrices. The results of the ACA are 
presented with each assets score across each broad consequence category, the Overall Consequence 
of Failure, the Probability of Failure and the Overall Asset Criticality Score. This summary allows sorting 
and ranking of the assets across several different aspects of criticality. Like the framework, the 
documentation of the ACA tool and its application process discussed in Chapter 5 could quickly be 
developed into a user guide and encourage improvements of the tool. 
 
Overall, the ACA tool was appropriate for its purpose and performed its intended function without 
issue. However, ultimately the framework should be implemented into the AMS so that asset data is 
live and there is a point-of-truth. The AMS is also the natural place to store condition data and asset 
attributes that can inform automated severity calculations. 
 
The third and final key objective was to analyse the results of the ACA framework and tool in detail. 
Up to 10 assets at a single site or the top 10 assets from each category were analysed with mixed 
results. A comparative graph was prepared for both the static Overall Consequence of Failure and 
dynamic Overall Asset Criticality to help visualise the impact that the Probability of Failure and a risk-
based approach had on criticality. The average criticality of each asset category was also determined 
and compared to consider which categories generally should be prioritised. 
 
As mentioned above, while the framework appeared to work appropriately for active assets, passive 
asset scoring was not always granular enough to uniquely prioritise assets. This was clear in the top 10 
critical assets across all categories in that 7 of the 10 had an equal score with another asset. The 
comparison between Overall Consequence of Failure and Overall Asset Criticality was interesting as it 
appeared to confirm the concept that a lower consequence asset with a higher probability of failure 
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could be more critical than a higher consequence asset. The key example of this was the most critical 
asset of the study which had a much lower consequence score but was in much poorer condition. This 
led to the observation that if maintenance actions were performed and condition was improved, the 
asset would drop down the prioritisation list to a score where an Overall Consequence of Failure only 
ACA might prioritise it. Without considering Probability of Failure the most critical asset may not have 
been prioritised for some time. 
 
The development of the ACA framework and tool is a step forward for the GRC WBU with respect to 
having a documented decision assistance system to support and justify asset management practices 
including data collection, condition assessment, maintenance management and capital works 
planning. The framework provides a preliminary foundation for GRC WBU to continuously develop to 
meet their specific needs. 
 
 
7.4 Future Work 
 
Throughout the development of the framework and application of the ACA two key observations were 
made which fell outside the scope of the original project specification. 
 
The main observation is that the framework currently only makes consideration of an assets worst 
case consequence and assumes catastrophic failure. In reality, catastrophic failure may be very rare 
but continual minor failures may be common. A key example of this is that large concrete tank 
structures such as the water treatment plant clarifier and sewerage treatment plant aerobic digestor 
tank are among the most critical assets in that an explosive wall failure and significant damage is 
expected, while the reality is more likely to be a leaking crack that can be repaired without a failure 
event. To address this, it is suggested that a range of low, medium and high consequence failures could 
be developed for each asset and align with differing probabilities of failure. These scores could be 
averaged to determine an overall score or remain separated. There are many other possibilities to 
address this observation. 
 
The secondary observation was that there was very little existing literature for aligning condition 
assessment scoring with probability of failure and as such the scoring used is not supported by any 
documented evidence or engineering. To address this it is suggested that research into how condition 
assessment aligns with probability of failure is completed and that the feasibility of using an estimated 
condition based on asset age compared with useful life aligned with probability of failure is confirmed. 
 
Other than these key observations, the ACA could be applied to an expanded or entire asset data set 
and re-analysed to confirm that conclusions made and recommendations made are appropriate. If 
successful the framework could be standardised and generalised to allow other organisations to adapt 
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 Project Specification 
 




For:  Timothy Wood  
Title:   Development of an Asset Prioritisation Framework for Gympie Regional Council’s Water 
and Sewerage Assets 
Major:  Civil Engineering  
Supervisors:  Jo Devine 
Sponsorship:  Gympie Regional Council 
Enrolment:  ENG4111 – EXT S1 & 2019 ENG4112 – EXT S2, 2019  
Project Aim:  To develop and document a framework  using a multi-criteria decision analysis model 
that can be used by GRC to determine the criticality of their infrastructure assets based 
on risk to help prioritise and improve efficiency of asset management practices (i.e data 
collection, condition assessment & preventative maintenance programs). 
 
Programme:  Version 4, 12th August 2019 
1. Review background information relating to asset management with respect to risk, 
consequence and impact areas (i.e. social, environmental, financial etc.) within GRC’s policies 
and practices. 
2. Review existing multi-criteria decision analysis (MCDA) models (e.g. Analytical Hierarchy 
Process/Analytical Network Process) with respect to framework input criteria and select the 
most appropriate model to use in the project. 
3. Develop a risk-based asset criticality rating framework and methodologies for water & 
sewerage infrastructure that align with GRC policies and objectives. 
4. Perform a gap analysis of the existing asset management database to identify what data is 
required before the criticality rating framework can be effectively applied (i.e. what level of 
detail of asset data capture is required for worthwhile results). Obtain or make relevant 
assumptions about missing data to ensure model has the data required to work correctly. 
5. Apply the framework to GRC’s assets using a Microsoft Excel based tool and analyse results. 
6. Calibrate framework if required and re-test. 
7. Preparation of a data collection improvement program recommendation based on the 
criticality score. 
8. Preparation of a condition assessment program recommendation based on the criticality 
score. 
If time and resources permit: 
9.  Preparation of a maintenance program recommendation based on the criticality score. 
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Water Consequence Weightings 
 
 
Category Category Weighting Sub Category Sub Category Weighting Global Weighting
Equivalent Population (EP) Impacted 20.86 5.66
Customer Type 4.81 1.31
Level of Redundancy 24.16 6.56
Failure Tolerance Period 50.17 13.62
Level of Potential Compliance Exceedance 50.00 10.77
Reporting Requirements 50.00 10.77
Proximity to Sensitive Areas 25.00 2.44
Level of Potential Contamination/Damage 75.00 7.33
Media Attention 50.00 2.44
Visibility to Public 50.00 2.44
Asset Cost 49.20 10.54
Difficulty of Repair 30.00 6.43
Type of Third-Party 5.22 1.12
Number of Impacted Parties 5.48 1.17
Cost of Lost Revenue 10.09 2.16
Equivalent Population (EP) Impacted 33.33 5.09
Level of Potential Impact 66.67 10.17
Consequence Categorys RAW 
Comparison
Operational Governance Environment Reputational Financial Safety
Operational 1.0000 2.0000 3.0000 4.0000 1.0000 2.0000
Governance 0.5000 1.0000 3.0000 4.0000 1.0000 2.0000
Environment 0.3333 0.3333 1.0000 4.0000 0.3333 0.5000
Reputational 0.2500 0.2500 0.2500 1.0000 0.2500 0.3333
Financial 1.0000 1.0000 3.0000 4.0000 1.0000 1.0000
Safety 0.5000 0.5000 2.0000 3.0000 1.0000 1.0000
Column Totals 3.5833 5.0833 12.2500 20.0000 4.5833 6.8333
Consequence Categorys Normalised 
Comparison






Operational 0.2791 0.3934 0.2449 0.2000 0.2182 0.2927 1.6283 27.14
Governance 0.1395 0.1967 0.2449 0.2000 0.2182 0.2927 1.2920 21.53
Environment 0.0930 0.0656 0.0816 0.2000 0.0727 0.0732 0.5861 9.77
Reputational 0.0698 0.0492 0.0204 0.0500 0.0545 0.0488 0.2927 4.88
Financial 0.2791 0.1967 0.2449 0.2000 0.2182 0.1463 1.2852 21.42
Safety 0.1395 0.0984 0.1633 0.1500 0.2182 0.1463 0.9157 15.26




CR < 10%? Yes






















Customer Type Level of Redundancy
Failure Tolerance 
Period
Equivalent Population (EP) Impacted 1.0000 6.0000 1.0000 0.2500
Customer Type 0.1667 1.0000 0.1667 0.1429
Level of Redundancy 1.0000 6.0000 1.0000 0.5000
Failure Tolerance Period 4.0000 7.0000 2.0000 1.0000














Equivalent Population (EP) Impacted 0.1622 0.3000 0.2400 0.1321 0.8342 20.86
Customer Type 0.0270 0.0500 0.0400 0.0755 0.1925 4.81
Level of Redundancy 0.1622 0.3000 0.2400 0.2642 0.9663 24.16
Failure Tolerance Period 0.6486 0.3500 0.4800 0.5283 2.0070 50.17




CR < 10%? Yes
Governance Consequence Sub-
Categories RAW Comparison




Level of Potential Compliance 
Exceedance
1.0000 1.0000
Reporting/Escalation Requirements 1.0000 1.0000
Column Totals 2.0000 2.0000
Governance Consequence Sub-
Categories Normalised Comparison







Level of Potential Compliance 
Exceedance
0.5000 0.5000 1.0000 50.00
Reporting/Escalation Requirements 0.5000 0.5000 1.0000 50.00












Proximity to Sensitive 
Areas
Level of Potential Contamination/Damage
Proximity to Sensitive Areas 1.0000 0.3333
Level of Potential 
Contamination/Damage
3.0000 1.0000
Column Totals 4.0000 1.3333
Enivornment Consequence Sub-
Categories Normalised Comparison
Proximity to Sensitive 
Areas




Proximity to Sensitive Areas 0.2500 0.2500 0.5000 25.00
Level of Potential 
Contamination/Damage
0.7500 0.7500 1.5000 75.00




CR < 10%? Yes
Reputation Consequence Sub-
Categories RAW Comparison
Media Attention Visibility to Public
Media Attention 1.0000 1.0000
Visibility to Public 1.0000 1.0000
Column Totals 2.0000 2.0000
Reputation Consequence Sub-
Categories Normalised Comparison




Media Attention 0.5000 0.5000 1.0000 50.00
Visibility to Public 0.5000 0.5000 1.0000 50.00










Financial Consequence Sub-Categories 
RAW Comparison






Asset Cost 1.0000 2.0000 8.0000 8.0000 6.0000
Difficulty of Repair 0.5000 1.0000 5.0000 5.0000 5.0000
Type of Third-Party 0.1250 0.2000 1.0000 1.0000 0.3333
Number of Impacted Parties 0.1250 0.2000 1.0000 1.0000 0.5000
Cost of Lost Revenue 0.1667 0.2000 3.0000 2.0000 1.0000
Column Totals 1.9167 3.6000 18.0000 17.0000 12.8333
Financial Consequence Sub-Categories 
Normalised Comparison











Asset Cost 0.5217 0.5556 0.4444 0.4706 0.4675 2.4599 49.20
Difficulty of Repair 0.2609 0.2778 0.2778 0.2941 0.3896 1.5002 30.00
Type of Third-Party 0.0652 0.0556 0.0556 0.0588 0.0260 0.2611 5.22
Number of Impacted Parties 0.0652 0.0556 0.0556 0.0588 0.0390 0.2741 5.48
Cost of Lost Revenue 0.0870 0.0556 0.1667 0.1176 0.0779 0.5047 10.09




CR < 10%? Yes




Level of Potential Impact
Equivalent Population (EP) Impacted 1.0000 0.5000
Level of Potential Impact 2.0000 1.0000
Column Totals 3.0000 1.5000








Equivalent Population (EP) Impacted 0.3333 0.3333 0.6667 33.33
Level of Potential Impact 0.6667 0.6667 1.3333 66.67




CR < 10%? Yes
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Sewerage Consequence Weightings 
 
 
Category Category Weighting Sub Category Sub Category Weighting Global Weighting
Equivalent Population (EP) Impacted 20.86 6.16
Customer Type 4.81 1.42
Level of Redundancy 24.16 7.13
Failure Tolerance Period 50.17 14.81
Level of Potential Compliance Exceedance 50.00 7.53
Reporting Requirements 50.00 7.53
Proximity to Sensitive Areas 25.00 3.76
Level of Potential Contamination/Damage 75.00 11.29
Media Attention 66.67 3.05
Visibility to Public 33.33 1.53
Asset Cost 55.66 12.44
Difficulty of Repair 31.16 6.96
Type of Third-Party 6.59 1.47
Number of Impacted Parties 6.59 1.47
Equivalent Population (EP) Impacted 33.33 4.48
Level of Potential Impact 66.67 8.96
Consequence Categorys RAW 
Comparison
Operational Governance Environment Reputational Financial Safety
Operational 1.0000 3.0000 3.0000 4.0000 1.0000 2.0000
Governance 0.3333 1.0000 1.0000 4.0000 1.0000 1.0000
Environment 0.3333 1.0000 1.0000 4.0000 1.0000 1.0000
Reputational 0.2500 0.2500 0.2500 1.0000 0.2500 0.2500
Financial 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 4.0000 1.0000 3.0000
Safety 0.5000 1.0000 1.0000 4.0000 0.3333 1.0000
Column Totals 3.4167 7.2500 7.2500 21.0000 4.5833 8.2500
Consequence Categorys Normalised 
Comparison






Operational 0.2927 0.4138 0.4138 0.1905 0.2182 0.2424 1.7714 29.52
Governance 0.0976 0.1379 0.1379 0.1905 0.2182 0.1212 0.9033 15.05
Environment 0.0976 0.1379 0.1379 0.1905 0.2182 0.1212 0.9033 15.05
Reputational 0.0732 0.0345 0.0345 0.0476 0.0545 0.0303 0.2746 4.58
Financial 0.2927 0.1379 0.1379 0.1905 0.2182 0.3636 1.3408 22.35
Safety 0.1463 0.1379 0.1379 0.1905 0.0727 0.1212 0.8066 13.44





















Customer Type Level of Redundancy
Failure Tolerance 
Period
Equivalent Population (EP) Impacted 1.0000 6.0000 1.0000 0.2500
Customer Type 0.1667 1.0000 0.1667 0.1429
Level of Redundancy 1.0000 6.0000 1.0000 0.5000
Failure Tolerance Period 4.0000 7.0000 2.0000 1.0000













Equivalent Population (EP) Impacted 0.1622 0.3000 0.2400 0.1321 0.8342 20.86
Customer Type 0.0270 0.0500 0.0400 0.0755 0.1925 4.81
Level of Redundancy 0.1622 0.3000 0.2400 0.2642 0.9663 24.16
Failure Tolerance Period 0.6486 0.3500 0.4800 0.5283 2.0070 50.17




CR < 10%? Yes
Governance Consequence Sub-
Categories RAW Comparison




Level of Potential Compliance 
Exceedance
1.0000 1.0000
Reporting/Escalation Requirements 1.0000 1.0000
Column Totals 2.0000 2.0000
Governance Consequence Sub-
Categories Normalised Comparison







Level of Potential Compliance 
Exceedance
0.5000 0.5000 1.0000 50.00
Reporting/Escalation Requirements 0.5000 0.5000 1.0000 50.00












Proximity to Sensitive 
Areas
Level of Potential Contamination/Damage
Proximity to Sensitive Areas 1.0000 0.3333
Level of Potential 
Contamination/Damage
3.0000 1.0000
Column Totals 4.0000 1.3333
Enivornment Consequence Sub-
Categories Normalised Comparison
Proximity to Sensitive 
Areas




Proximity to Sensitive Areas 0.2500 0.2500 0.5000 25.00
Level of Potential 
Contamination/Damage
0.7500 0.7500 1.5000 75.00




CR < 10%? Yes
Reputation Consequence Sub-
Categories RAW Comparison
Media Attention Visibility to Public
Media Attention 1.0000 2.0000
Visibility to Public 0.5000 1.0000
Column Totals 1.5000 3.0000
Reputation Consequence Sub-
Categories Normalised Comparison




Media Attention 0.6667 0.6667 1.3333 66.67
Visibility to Public 0.3333 0.3333 0.6667 33.33










Financial Consequence Sub-Categories 
RAW Comparison
Asset Cost Difficulty of Repair Type of Third-Party
Number of 
Impacted Parties
Asset Cost 1.0000 2.0000 8.0000 8.0000
Difficulty of Repair 0.5000 1.0000 5.0000 5.0000
Type of Third-Party 0.1250 0.2000 1.0000 1.0000
Number of Impacted Parties 0.1250 0.2000 1.0000 1.0000
Column Totals 1.7500 3.4000 15.0000 15.0000
Financial Consequence Sub-Categories 
Normalised Comparison








Asset Cost 0.5714 0.5882 0.5333 0.5333 2.2263 55.66
Difficulty of Repair 0.2857 0.2941 0.3333 0.3333 1.2465 31.16
Type of Third-Party 0.0714 0.0588 0.0667 0.0667 0.2636 6.59
Number of Impacted Parties 0.0714 0.0588 0.0667 0.0667 0.2636 6.59




CR < 10%? Yes




Level of Potential Impact
Equivalent Population (EP) Impacted 1.0000 0.5000
Level of Potential Impact 2.0000 1.0000
Column Totals 3.0000 1.5000








Equivalent Population (EP) Impacted 0.3333 0.3333 0.6667 33.33
Level of Potential Impact 0.6667 0.6667 1.3333 66.67




CR < 10%? Yes
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CIV.001468 Water Rainbow Beach Bore TWS1 Bore Structure 15.13 8.61 6.84 1.46 11.83 3.05 46.93 50.00 23.47
CIV.001472 Water Rainbow Beach Bore TWS1 Pipework 12.51 6.46 4.88 2.93 5.87 9.16 41.81 50.00 20.90
CSY.012043 Water Rainbow Beach Bore TWS1 Telemetry 10.77 6.46 1.95 1.46 8.96 3.05 32.67 50.00 16.33
ELE.001636 Water Rainbow Beach Bore TWS1 Switchboard 15.13 6.46 1.95 1.46 10.55 11.19 46.75 50.00 23.37
WPU.001704 Water Rainbow Beach Bore TWS1 Pump Bore 13.82 6.46 6.84 1.46 9.26 3.05 40.90 50.00 20.45
CIV.001341 Water Kinbombi Creek Weir Spillway / Embankment 8.39 10.77 5.37 1.46 18.16 3.05 47.20 50.00 23.60
CIV.001342 Water Kinbombi Creek Weir Inlet Tower 8.39 10.77 5.37 1.46 14.76 3.05 43.81 50.00 21.91
CIV.001343 Water Kinbombi Creek Weir Walkway 7.26 6.46 5.37 1.46 7.68 3.05 31.29 75.00 23.47
CIV.001308 Water Jones Hill WTP 01 Intake Works - Intake Works 27.14 10.77 5.37 2.44 15.10 13.23 74.04 50.00 37.02
CSY.011997 Water Jones Hill WTP 01 Intake Works - Intake Works 25.83 6.46 1.95 1.46 11.24 3.05 50.00 50.00 25.00
CIV.001309 Water Jones Hill WTP 02 Raw Water PS - Pipework 23.20 8.61 4.88 1.46 15.46 13.23 66.85 50.00 33.42
CIV.001310 Water Jones Hill WTP 02 Raw Water PS - Structure Raw Water PS 25.83 8.61 4.88 2.44 16.74 13.23 71.73 50.00 35.87
CIV.001311 Water Jones Hill WTP 02 Raw Water PS - Pump well 27.14 10.77 6.84 2.44 21.42 13.23 81.83 50.00 40.91
CIV.001312 Water Jones Hill WTP 02 Raw Water PS - Valves 25.83 6.46 3.42 1.46 15.46 13.23 65.85 50.00 32.93
WPE.001721 Water Jones Hill WTP 02 Raw Water PS - Crane 9.36 6.46 1.95 0.98 11.89 11.19 41.83 50.00 20.92
WPU.001648 Water Jones Hill WTP 02 Raw Water PS - Pump Raw Water A2 21.79 8.61 1.95 1.46 14.18 13.23 61.23 50.00 30.61
WPU.001649 Water Jones Hill WTP 02 Raw Water PS - Pump Raw Water A4 21.79 8.61 1.95 1.46 14.18 13.23 61.23 50.00 30.61
WPU.001650 Water Jones Hill WTP 02 Raw Water PS - Pump Raw Water A1 21.79 8.61 1.95 1.46 14.18 13.23 61.23 50.00 30.61
CIV.001313 Water Jones Hill WTP 03 Clarification - Tank Clarifier 27.14 10.77 4.40 2.44 21.42 15.26 81.42 50.00 40.71
WPE.001722 Water Jones Hill WTP 03 Clarification - Scraper Drive 23.10 12.92 1.95 1.46 18.03 13.23 70.69 75.00 53.02
WPE.001723 Water Jones Hill WTP 03 Clarification - Clarifier 23.10 15.07 1.95 1.46 18.03 13.23 72.85 50.00 36.42
CIV.001314 Water Jones Hill WTP 04 Floculation - Tank Floculation 27.14 10.77 4.40 2.44 19.31 15.26 79.31 50.00 39.66
WPE.001724 Water Jones Hill WTP 04 Floculation - Mixer 23.10 15.07 1.95 1.46 18.03 13.23 72.85 50.00 36.42
CIV.001315 Water Jones Hill WTP 06 Filtration - Valves 23.10 8.61 3.42 1.46 18.85 15.26 70.71 50.00 35.36
CIV.001316 Water Jones Hill WTP 06 Filtration - Tank Filtration 27.14 10.77 3.42 2.44 21.42 15.26 80.44 50.00 40.22
CSY.011998 Water Jones Hill WTP 06 Filtration - Filtration 27.14 15.07 3.42 2.44 18.03 15.26 81.36 50.00 40.68
WPE.001725 Water Jones Hill WTP 06 Filtration - Filter 27.14 15.07 3.42 2.44 18.03 15.26 81.36 50.00 40.68
WPU.001653 Water Jones Hill WTP 08 Clear Water PS - Pump Clear Water B2 21.79 8.61 1.95 1.46 16.74 15.26 65.83 50.00 32.91
WPU.001654 Water Jones Hill WTP 08 Clear Water PS - Pump Clear Water B1 21.79 8.61 1.95 1.46 16.74 15.26 65.83 50.00 32.91
WPU.001651 Water Jones Hill WTP 08 Clear Water PS - Pump Clear Water C1 21.79 8.61 1.95 1.46 14.63 15.26 63.72 50.00 31.86
WPU.001652 Water Jones Hill WTP 08 Clear Water PS - Pump Clear Water C2 21.79 8.61 1.95 1.46 14.63 15.26 63.72 50.00 31.86
CIV.001319 Water Jones Hill WTP 09 Backwash System - Tank Backwash 24.41 15.07 5.86 1.46 21.42 15.26 83.49 50.00 41.75
CIV.001318 Water Jones Hill WTP 09 Backwash System - Backwash Tank 21.79 6.46 1.95 0.98 11.24 15.26 57.68 50.00 28.84
CIV.001321 Water Jones Hill WTP 09 Backwash System - Tank Backwash 1 10.67 6.46 3.91 1.46 15.75 3.05 41.30 50.00 20.65
CIV.001317 Water Jones Hill WTP 09 Backwash System - Backwash Tank 8.05 6.46 1.95 0.98 9.78 3.05 30.28 50.00 15.14
CIV.001320 Water Jones Hill WTP 09 Backwash System - Tank Backwash 2 8.05 6.46 1.95 0.98 9.78 3.05 30.28 50.00 15.14
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Visibility to Public 
Score
Asset Cost Score
Difficulty of Repair 
Score










Level of Potential 
Impact Score
CIV.001468 Water Civil 3 4 4 2 1 3 5 3 2 1 2 4 3 4 2 1 1
CIV.001472 Water Civil 3 4 2 2 1 2 4 2 3 3 1 1 3 4 2 1 4
CSY 012043 Water Control Systems 1 1 3 2 1 2 1 1 2 1 2 3 1 1 1 1 1
ELE.001636 Water Electrical 3 4 4 2 1 2 1 1 2 1 2 3 3 4 2 1 5
WPU.001704 Water Water Pump 3 4 3 2 1 2 5 3 2 1 2 2 3 4 2 1 1
CIV.001341 Water Civil 2 3 2 1 2 3 5 2 2 1 5 4 3 4 2 1 1
CIV.001342 Water Civil 2 3 2 1 2 3 5 2 2 1 4 3 3 4 2 1 1
CIV.001343 Water Civil 1 3 2 1 1 2 5 2 2 1 2 2 1 1 1 1 1
CIV.001308 Water Civil 5 5 5 5 1 4 5 2 4 1 2 5 5 5 5 5 4
CSY 011997 Water Control Systems 5 5 4 5 1 2 1 1 2 1 2 2 5 5 5 1 1
CIV.001309 Water Civil 5 5 2 5 1 3 4 2 2 1 4 2 5 5 5 5 4
CIV.001310 Water Civil 5 5 4 5 1 3 4 2 4 1 4 3 5 5 5 5 4
CIV.001311 Water Civil 5 5 5 5 1 4 5 3 4 1 5 5 5 5 5 5 4
CIV.001312 Water Civil 5 5 4 5 1 2 1 2 2 1 4 2 5 5 5 5 4
WPE.001721 Water Water Plant & Equipment 1 1 4 1 1 2 1 1 1 1 4 2 1 1 1 1 5
WPU.001648 Water Water Pump 5 5 3 4 1 3 1 1 2 1 3 3 4 4 5 5 4
WPU.001649 Water Water Pump 5 5 3 4 1 3 1 1 2 1 3 3 4 4 5 5 4
WPU.001650 Water Water Pump 5 5 3 4 1 3 1 1 2 1 3 3 4 4 5 5 4
CIV.001313 Water Civil 5 5 5 5 1 4 3 2 4 1 5 5 5 5 5 5 5
WPE.001722 Water Water Plant & Equipment 5 5 4 4 3 3 1 1 2 1 4 4 5 5 5 5 4
WPE.001723 Water Water Plant & Equipment 5 5 4 4 3 4 1 1 2 1 4 4 5 5 5 5 4
CIV.001314 Water Civil 5 5 5 5 1 4 3 2 4 1 4 5 5 5 5 5 5
WPE.001724 Water Water Plant & Equipment 5 5 4 4 3 4 1 1 2 1 4 4 5 5 5 5 4
CIV.001315 Water Civil 5 5 4 4 1 3 1 2 2 1 5 3 5 5 5 5 5
CIV.001316 Water Civil 5 5 5 5 1 4 1 2 4 1 5 5 5 5 5 5 5
CSY 011998 Water Control Systems 5 5 5 5 3 4 1 2 4 1 4 4 5 5 5 5 5
WPE.001725 Water Water Plant & Equipment 5 5 5 5 3 4 1 2 4 1 4 4 5 5 5 5 5
WPU.001653 Water Water Pump 5 5 3 4 1 3 1 1 2 1 4 3 5 5 5 5 5
WPU.001654 Water Water Pump 5 5 3 4 1 3 1 1 2 1 4 3 5 5 5 5 5
WPU.001651 Water Water Pump 5 5 3 4 1 3 1 1 2 1 3 3 5 5 5 5 5
WPU.001652 Water Water Pump 5 5 3 4 1 3 1 1 2 1 3 3 5 5 5 5 5
CIV.001319 Water Civil 5 5 5 4 3 4 3 3 2 1 5 5 5 5 5 5 5
CIV.001318 Water Civil 5 5 3 4 1 2 1 1 1 1 2 2 5 5 5 5 5
CIV.001321 Water Civil 1 1 5 1 1 2 2 2 2 1 4 5 1 1 1 1 1
CIV.001317 Water Civil 1 1 3 1 1 2 1 1 1 1 3 2 1 1 1 1 1
CIV.001320 Water Civil 1 1 3 1 1 2 1 1 1 1 3 2 1 1 1 1 1
CIV.001323 Water Civil 5 5 4 3 1 3 3 2 2 1 4 4 1 1 5 1 1
ELE.001605 Water Electrical 5 5 3 3 1 2 1 1 1 1 3 3 1 1 5 1 5
WPE.001726 Water Water Plant & Equipment 5 5 4 3 1 3 1 1 1 1 4 3 1 1 5 1 4
WPE.001727 Water Water Plant & Equipment 5 5 4 3 1 2 1 1 1 1 3 3 1 1 5 1 1
WPE.001729 Water Water Plant & Equipment 5 5 3 3 1 2 1 1 1 1 1 2 1 1 5 1 1
WPU.001655 Water Water Pump 5 5 3 3 1 2 1 1 1 1 1 2 1 1 5 1 1
WPU.001656 Water Water Pump 5 5 2 3 1 2 1 1 1 1 2 2 1 1 5 1 1
WPU.001657 Water Water Pump 5 5 2 3 1 2 1 1 1 1 2 2 1 1 5 1 1
Safety
Asset Number



















































































 Project Risk Assessment 
 
Adopted Risk Policy 
 
The University of Southern Queensland’s current Risk Management Policy and Risk Management Plan 
(RMP) (V1.1) have been adopted as the risk framework to be used during the research project. The risk 
assessment matrix of the RMP has been used to ensure assessed risks align with USQ policies. 
 
 
Figure 0-1: USQ Risk Assessment Matrix (USQ 2019) 
 
 




Table 0-1: USQ Consequence Definitions (USQ 2019) 
Consequence Examples of Consequence 
Insignificant No injuries. Minor delays. 
Minor 
First aid required. Small spill/gas release easily contained within work area. Nil 
environmental impact. 
Moderate 
Medical treatment required. Large spill/gas release contained on campus with 
help of emergency services. Nil environmental impact. 
Major 
Extensive or multiple injuries. Hospitalisation required. Permanent severe health 
effects. Spill/gas release spreads outside campus area. Minimal environmental 
impact. 
Catastrophic 
Death of one or more people. Toxic substance or toxic gas release spreads 




Table 0-2: USQ Probably Definitions (USQ 2019) 
Probability Examples of Probability 
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 Exposure to high voltage electrical infrastructure (switchboards, control panels etc.) 
 Exposure to hazardous chemicals and liquids (fluoride, acids, chlorine gas, raw sewerage) 
 Exposure to large open water tanks without escape measures (bio-basins, clarifiers, aeration 
basins etc.) 
 
The exposure to these risks can be eliminated or minimised by implementing the following controls: 
 
• Complete a GRC general induction, including a site-specific induction for each location and 
comply with all procedures and policies 
• Wear appropriate PPE (hat/hardhat, eye protection, ear plugs, long sleeved high visibility 
clothing, safety boots, gloves) in accordance with requirements of the site-specific 
induction and any Safe Work Method Statements 
• Sign in on each separate visit and ensure staff escort available 
• Do not attend any location on site where an electrical switchboard is open or work being 
completed under any circumstances 
• Do not enter rooms/compounds housing hazardous chemicals 
• Do not attend large open water tanks without an escort and ensure handrails are used at 
all times 
 
The above risks (after proposed controls) have been summarised and assessed in the following table: 
 
 













Exposure to plant and vehicle traffic on 
site 
Rare Major L Accepted 
2 
Exposure to machinery and moving 
objects operating under pressure 
Unlikely Major M Accepted 
3 
Exposure to high noise levels from 
operating machinery 
Unlikely Moderate M Accepted 
4 
Exposure to high voltage electrical 
infrastructure 
Rare Major L Accepted 
5 
Exposure to hazardous chemicals and 
liquids 
Rare Major L Accepted 
6 
Exposure to large open water tanks 
without escape measures 
Rare Catastrophic L Accepted 
 
 
Project Dissertation Preparation 
 
Health & safety considerations also need to be made regarding the development of the dissertation 
document. While on first observation there are no obvious physical risks, there are still hazards that 
need to be controlled. These hazards include: 
 
 Poor posture and ergonomics leading to pain or injury in back, neck, eyestrain, wrist etc. 
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 Illness and metal fatigue from significant project working hours/meeting deadlines, other 
subject assignment deadlines/exams, real life work requirements and family commitments. 
 Loss of data due to equipment failure, accidental loss or lack of permission to use data. 
 Breakdown in communication with supervisor leading to unsatisfactory submission and 
rework or failure of the course. 
 
Potential controls for the above hazards are as follows: 
• Ensuring working station is set up ergonomically, well-lit and ventilated 
• Take regular breaks, stretch and ensure reasonable amount of sleep is achieved each night 
• Ensure project work is planned and is achievable within the scheduled timeframe. Reassess 
and reallocate resources as required. 
• Ensure regular backups are made, documents are split to reduce file sizes/corruption and 
copies are stored on reliable media (i.e. cloud and local hardrives). Do not use USB devices. 
• Ensure agreements are made upfront regarding the use of data and keep GRC informed 
• Ensure consistent open communication with supervisor and keep on track with agreed 
schedule 
 
The USQ consequence descriptions don’t always align with risks of this nature. Therefore, the 
consequence for items 3 & 4 in the following table should be viewed with a Major consequence aligning 
with course failure. 
 
 












1 Poor posture and ergonomics Possible Minor M Accepted 
2 Illness and metal fatigue Possible Minor M Accepted 
3 Loss of data Rare Major L Accepted 
4 
Breakdown in communication with 
supervisor 





The dissertation produced as part of ENG4111/4112 Research Project forms a professional student 
research document that can and will end up accessible by University staff and the general public. The 
content of the dissertation including its source data, intellectual property and findings may be 
contentious to various parties and therefore risks post-completion also need to be considered. 
Identified ongoing risks include: 
 
1. GRC data could be taken out of context and seen in a negative way by the public (i.e 
poor/missing asset data, incorrect costs etc.) 
2. GRC unsatisfied with outcomes of project choose not to further develop or implement the 
framework. Therefore, the ultimate purpose of the study would not be achieved. 
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Poor execution of the project could produce incorrect or misleading results. If implemented by GRC 
or other entities this could result in poor asset management practices increasing costs, wasting 
resources and reducing efficiency. 
